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I. INTRODUCTION
At its most basic, a deficiency judgment is a procedural tool that
allows a secured creditor who sells collateral for less than the total
amount owed on a loan to collect the difference (the deficiency)
from a defaulting borrower. The Louisiana Deficiency Judgment
Act' is not a solution unique to Louisiana, as many other states
employ statutes and follow jurisprudential pronouncements that
recognize deficiency judgments in some form or fashion,2 and
numerous courts even use the phrase "deficiency judgment" when
describing their state's rules.
3
1. The Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act consists of LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13:4106-4108.3 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Terry M. Anderson, Noncomplying Secured Creditors,
Deficiency Judgments, and Implied Satisfactions Under the Nebraska Uniform
Commercial Code, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1992); Bruce J. Bergman, Insurance
Claims and the Deficiency Judgment, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 328 (2000);
Joseph P. Cook, The Secured Party's Right To A Deficiency Judgment Afier
Violating U C.C. Section 9-504(3): A Tabuler Approach, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 242 (1995); Ellen Barrie Corenswet, I Can Get It For You Wholesale: The
Lingering Problem of Automobile Deficiency Judgments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1081
(1975); Michael W. Dunagan, Repossession Issues, Deficiency Judgments and
Bankruptcy Considerations For Sub-Prime Auto Lenders, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 384 (1995); Craig W. Friedrich, Workouts: Separate Surviving Deficiency
Judgment Reduces Amount Realized On Foreclosure, 20 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 189
(1993); Benjamin Gruberg, When Is a Mortgage Guarantee Not Worth the Price
of a Notary?-The Incongruent Judicial Application of New York's Deficiency
Judgment Statute, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 2053 (1997); James S. Hering, Real
Property Foreclosure In Texas: What Is Deficient About the Texas Deficiency
Judgment Statute?, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 377 (1996); Tiffany B. Lonnevik, Midfirst
Bank v. Ranieri: An Update On Deficiency Judgments Under Montana's Small
Tract Financing Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 547 (1994); David B. McMahon,
Commercially Reasonable Sales and Deficiency Judgments Under U C.C. Article
9: An Analysis of Revision Proposals, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 64 (1994);
David Lance Swanson, The Disposition of Repossessed Collateral In Tennessee:
Notice, Commercial Reasonableness, and Deficiency Judgments, 16 MEM. ST. U.
L. REV. 375 (1986); Wanda M. Temm, Creditor Beware: From Default Through
Deficiency Judgment, 60 J. KAN. B.A. 17 (Oct. 1991); Timothy J. Thomason,
James J. Pisanelli & Mark Deatherage, Arizona's Deficiency Laws: When Is a
Deficiency Judgment Available and How Is One Obtained?, 28 ARIZ. ATr'Y 23
(Apr. 1992).
3. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Archer Bank, 895 N.E.2d 677, 682
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (overturning a trial court's procedural ruling, noting that it
"increased the likelihood that [the debtor] would face a deficiency judgment");
Balvich v. Spicer, 894 N.E.2d 235, 236 (Ind. App. 2008) (involving a claim "for
contribution on various deficiency judgments that had been entered . . .");
Wellington Co., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust v. Shakiba, 952 A.2d 328, 336
(Md. App. 2008) (stating that, under Maryland statutes, a creditor is "required to
file a motion for a deficiency judgment within three (3) years"); Viafax Corp. v.
Citicorp Leasing, Inc., 54 A.D.3d 846, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (involving a
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The concept underlying all deficiency judgment rules
represents a balancing of the interests of creditors (who desire to
be paid in full), debtors (who desire to have the maximum value of
the collateral which secures their obligation applied to their debt
before they are pursued personally), and public policy (which
seeks to prevent creditors from receiving a windfall either by
under-valuing collateral or by selling collateral in a fashion that
brings less than its true value). Each state balances these interests
in a different fashion: some mandate procedural steps be followed,4
others set time limits for obtaining a deficiency, 5 and others look to
the method by which the collateral was sold.6
This Article explores Louisiana's rules on deficiency judgment
and how these rules have changed over time. The rules on
deficiency judgment in Louisiana are statutory and flow from two
separate sources-the Deficiency Judgment Act7  and the
provisions of Louisiana's version of U.C.C. article 9.
8
II. IN LOUISIANA, A DEBTOR RETAINS TITLE TO COLLATERAL; THE
CREDITORS MERELY GET A RIGHT TO SEIZE AND SELL THE ASSET
AND GET A PRIVILEGE ON THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE
To fully appreciate Louisiana's rules on deficiency judgments,
one must first take into account Louisiana's "title theory" of
security devices and the fact that Louisiana, traditionally, has
rejected self-help and has required creditors to use lawsuits to
foreclose on the collateral that secures their loans.
As a civil law state, Louisiana has long-rejected the notion that
the way a creditor obtains security for a loan is by a transfer be it
real or fictitious) of the ownership of collateral to the creditor. The
creditor who was "not entitled to a deficiency judgment . . ."); Brown v.
Household Realty Corp., 189 P.3d 233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that,
under Washington state law, "nonjudicial foreclosure procedure [by a] trustee's
sale bars any deficiency judgment").
4. Cf Wash. Mut. Bank, 895 N.E.2d 677; Brown, 189 P.3d at 238.
5. See, e.g., Wellington, 952 A.2d at 336.
6. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stoval, 872 N.E.2d 91 (111.
App. Ct. 2007); Merchants Bank of N.Y. v. Gold Lane Corp., 814 N.Y.S.2d 99
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4106-4108.3 (2006).
8. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-101-9-710 (2002), specifically
referring to LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-610-9-624.
9. Louisiana Civil Code article 3278 defines mortgage. Official comment
(b) states that a "mortgage neither gives 'title' nor possession to the mortgagee."
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3278 cmt. b (2009). The comment cites Howe v. Austin, 40
La. Ann. 323 (La. 1888); Miller v. Shotwell, 38 La. Ann. 890 (La. 1886);
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Louisiana approach recognizes that ownership of the collateral
always remains with the debtor and that all the creditor can obtain
is (1) a conventional security interest or mortgage10 that affects
third parties, and (2) a right to seize and sell the collateral and
obtain a privilege on the proceeds of the sale." The Louisiana rule
is so strong that public policy forbids a debtor, at the time of giving
a security interest in collateral, to agree that if the debtor ever
defaults, the creditor automatically becomes owner of the
collateral. 12
Duclaud v. Rousseau, 2 La. Ann. 168 (La. 1847). See also Alcolea v. Smith, 90
So. 769 (La. 1921).
10. In this sentence, "security interest" is used in its broadest sense and
includes all forms of contractual methods of securing loans including
antichresis, Louisiana's pledge of immovable property (LA. Civ. CODE art. 3176
and following), Louisiana's version of the Uniform Commercial Code (LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:8-101 (2003) and following, and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-
101 and following) as well as other contractual methods of securing loans, such
as assignments of rent (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (2009)).
11. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 3279 (providing that a mortgage gives "the
right to cause the property to be seized and sold ... and to have the proceeds
applied toward the satisfaction of the obligation in preference to claims of
others"); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3179, concerning antichresis (the "creditor does not
become owner of the pledged immovable by failure of payment at the stated
time; any clause to the contrary is null, and in this case it is only lawful for him
to sue his debtor before the court in order to ... cause the objects which have
been put in his hands in pledge to be seized and sold."); LA. Civ. CODE arts.
3157, 3165, concerning pawn (the pledge of movables or personal property).
12. Alcolea, 90 So. at 771:
Since the edict of Constantine annulling and prohibiting what was
known as the lex commissoria and the stipulation in the contract of
pledge which it authorized, whereby, in default of payment by the
pledgor, the thing pledged became the property of the pledgee without
further action on his part, such stipulations have been prohibited in all
countries where the civil law prevails, and the prohibition has long
since become part of the common law, the commentators on both
systems agreeing that they are contra bonos mores and oppressive; that
they involve the abuse of the power of the strong over the weak,
represent odious speculations by those who have money, at the expense
of those who need it, and are unconscionable. Denis on Contracts of
Pledge, c. XXIV, p. 253 et seq., citing Troplong, Nantissement, § 379
et seq.; Pothier, Nantissement, § 18; De St. Joseph, Concordance des
Codes Civiles, p. 109; Merlin, Rept. verbo 'Gage'; C. N. 2578; Story
on Bailments, § 345; Kent's Com. vol. 2, § 583; Jones on Pledges, §
553; Rev. Civ. Code La. art. 3132; Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. 139, 12
How. 139, 13 L. Ed. 927; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U. S. 332, 24 L. Ed. 775;
Pritchard v. Elton, 38 Conn. 434.
This rule, however, applies only to agreements between a creditor and debtor
prior to a default; after a default occurs, the creditor and debtor may agree to a
dation en paiement, the Louisiana term for a "giving in payment"-a complete
2009]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Louisiana's refusal to recognize real or fictional transfers of
title to a creditor as a method of securing loans 13 is different from
the common law "deed of trust" theory (in which title is deemed to
be transferred to the creditor until the loan is paid).' 4 In fact, the
use of a "deed of trust" in Louisiana has been held to result not in a
transfer of title but merely a Louisiana mortgage, with no transfer
of title to the creditor, for Louisiana puts the substance of the
transaction over the form when the substance is apparent on the
face of the document.' 5
or partial satisfaction of the debt by transferring the ownership of the collateral
to the creditor. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2655-2657; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
13:4108.1, 4108.2; infra note 23.
13. Out of state attorneys should not be confused by the fact that sometimes
the term "assignment" is used in Louisiana law to refer to a transfer of title and
other times as a security interest. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401
(regarding a lessor giving a security interest in the rental stream from immovable
property). However, it is clear that even though an "assignment" is usually thought
of as part of the "sale" articles of the Louisiana Civil Code (cf LA. Civ. CODE arts.
2438 and following), when an "assignment" is for the purpose of granting a
security interest, the debtor never loses ownership of the collateral. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (expressly stating that "[a]ny obligation may be secured by
an assignment by a lessor or sublessor of leases or rents, or both leases and rents,
pertaining to immovable property") (emphasis added).
14. See In re Roberts, 26 B.R. 397, 399 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) ("Maine has
adopted the title theory of mortgages which provides that a mortgage is a
conditional conveyance that vests legal title in the mortgagee."); Bailey
Mortgage Co. v. Gobble-Fite Lumber Co., Inc., 565 So. 2d 138, 143 (Ala. 1990)
("Alabama is a title theory state . . . a mortgage passes legal title to the
mortgagee, and the mortgagor is left with the equity of redemption.");
Conference Ctr. Ltd. v. Research Corp. of New England, 455 A.2d 857, 860
(Conn. 1983) ("[A] mortgagee.., both by common-law rule and by statute, is
deemed to have taken legal title upon the execution of the mortgage .... As a
titleholder, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the mortgagee has a
right to immediate possession against the mortgagor."); Houle v. Guilbeault, 40
A.2d 438, 440 (R.I. 1944) ("In this state a first mortgage is a conveyance to [the]
mortgagee of the legal fee in the land defeasible upon condition that the
mortgagor will perform the condition of the mortgage."). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §4.1, at 191-201 (1997).
15. In Miller v. Shotwell, 38 La. Ann. 890, 892 (La. 1886), the parties used an
Alabama deed of trust form concerning property located in Louisiana. The Louisiana
Supreme Court looked at the entirety of the form and concluded that because, on the
face of the document, the creditor was the buyer of the property rather than the seller
(as would usually be the case with a credit sale), the document in fact was a
mortgage and not a transfer of ownership. As the court stated:
The text of the instrument, viewed in the light of our jurisprudence, and
of the laws of Alabama, as shown both by evidence and authority,
leaves no doubt in our minds as to the true intention of the parties
thereto. It was clearly to create a mortgage by way of security for the
purchase price of the lands therein described.
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The Restatement of the Law of Property, Mortgages has
rejected the "title transfer" theory in deed of trust transactions and
recognizes that the essence of a secured loan is that the ownership
of the collateral should be seen as remaining with the debtor until
default.1 6 Because title to the collateral always remains with the
debtor, a default by the debtor does not result in an immediate
transfer of ownership to the creditor in Louisiana. Rather, the
creditor must take steps to seize and dispose of the collateral and
seek to apply the proceeds of the sale to the debt. The secured
creditor's rights to the proceeds are said to be a "privilege,"
because if the security interest is properly perfected, the secured
creditor is entitled to the proceeds in preference to the claims of the
debtor and all other third parties whose security interests are
inferior to those of the foreclosing creditor.'
7
III. LOUISIANA HAS TRADITIONALLY REQUIRED A CREDITOR TO
USE JUDICIAL PROCESS TO SELL THE COLLATERAL WHICH SECURES
A LOAN
A Louisiana creditor is 9ermitted to foreclose on collateral only
upon the debtor's default. Louisiana has always rejected "self-
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §4. 1, at 182-204 (1997).
17. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3278 (a mortgage creates a "nonpossessory"
right over property securing certain obligations). Civil Code article 3279
outlines the rights granted to the mortgagee by virtue of its security. Among
those include: the "right to cause the property to be seized and sold in the
manner provided by law" upon the default of the mortgagor. The article
continues by noting that the proceeds of the sale are to be "applied toward the
satisfaction of the obligation in preference to the claims of others." Id. art. 3279.
Civil Code article 3307 generally delineates the order of preference that
proceeds are distributed to creditors when a debtor's property is sold. The article
states that the "mortgagee is preferred to [1] the unsecured creditor and [2] to
[other mortgagees] whose rights became effective after the mortgage becomes
effective as to them." Id. art. 3307. Civil Code article 3338 provides that an
instrument creating real rights in immovable property (such as mortgage) must
be recorded in the mortgage or conveyance record to have effect as to third
persons (such as unsecured creditors or superior or future inferior mortgagees).
Civil Code article 3347 provides that the effect of recordation on third parties
begins when the instrument is filed with the recorder of mortgages. The article
further provides that the document is considered filed when accepted by the
recorder for filing. Earlier filed mortgages outrank those that are subsequently
filed, and the earlier or superior mortgage will be paid in preference to the later
or inferior mortgage.
18. Louisiana law prohibits the creditor from obtaining ownership of the
collateral prior to default. See Alcolea v. Smith, 90 So. 769, 771 (La. 1921). See
also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3279 (conditioning the right to seize and sell collateral
"upon failure of the obligor to perform the obligation that the mortgage
secures").
2009] 789
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help"; with only a few limited exceptions, 19 a creditor who
attempts to take control of collateral outside of judicial process
commits a tort.20 Thus, to distinguish these unlawful transactions
from proper situations where the creditor does not commit a tort
but where the question is the availability of a deficiency judgment,
the remainder of this Article uses the phrase "private sale" only in
reference to debtors who have voluntarily turned possession of the
collateral over to the creditor for disposition.
Louisiana creditors may utilize one of three methods to recoup
value from collateral: by judicial sale, 21 by a private sale conducted
19. Louisiana law provides few self-help provisions. For instance, Revised
Statutes section 9:4759 gives the owner of a self-storage facility, upon the default
of a person leasing storage space, the right to "remove any lock on the rented self-
storage space.., compile a brief and general description of the movable property
upon which a privilege is claimed and shall be entitled to place his own lock upon
such space until his privilege is satisfied." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4759 (2007).
The statute details further steps to be taken to notify the lessee of the intent to sell
the seized property in order to satisfy the privilege.
Section 9:4502(C) gives the repairmen of movable goods (personal property)
the right to sell collateral under $10 in value in the event of default. The
provision states, in pertinent part, that where collateral:
is of a value often dollars or less... then it shall not be necessary to advertise
such property for sale, but in lieu thereof the privilege holder shall, at least
ten days prior to such sale, mail by registered mail to the owner or apparent
owner at his last known address a notice stating the intention to sell such
property and giving the date, time and place of the sale.
Id. § 9:4502(C).
20. See, e.g., Bryant v. Sears Consumer Fin. Corp., 617 So. 2d 1191 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 619 So. 2d 533 (La. 1993). Cf Dixie Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Pitre, 751 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 751 So. 2d 855
(La. 1999).
21. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2291 states that money
judgments can be satisfied by seizure and sale of property. The following
procedural code articles describe the process of seizure under Louisiana's writ
offierifacias and subsequent judicial sale. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 2291 (2009).
Code of Civil Procedure article 2253 allows a judgment creditor to obtain a writ
"directing the sheriff of the parish where the judgment is to be executed to
enforce [the writ]." Under article 2294, seizure by a writ offierifacias must be
made within one year. Code of Civil Procedure article 2293 directs the sheriff to
file a notice of seizure in the mortgage records of the parish where the
immovable property is located, to serve the judgment debtor and the occupants
of the property with a notice of seizure that lists the property that has been
seized, and to file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court who issued the writ listing
the names of all persons provided notice of the seizure. Article 2294 mandates
that when seizure has been made, the sheriff must proceed with a sale. Article
2331 directs the sheriff to publish notice of sale, twice in the event that the
seized property is immovable. Article 2332 provides that the property shall be
appraised unless the mortgage contains a waiver of appraisal and the seizing
creditor directs the sale to be conducted without appraisal. The property is sold
subject to any superior mortgages. Id. art. 2335.
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after the debtor has voluntarily turned over the collateral to the
creditor,22 or by the debtor's voluntary transfer of ownership to the
creditor after default. 23 In each instance, the creditor must apply
the proceeds realized from disposition of collateral to the debtor's
outstanding debt. If a balance remains owing to the creditor after
applying the sales proceeds to the debt, Louisiana law prevents the
creditor from pursuing the debtor personally for the balance (the
"deficiency") unless the creditor has followed certain procedures
and complied with certain statutory conditions. Following these
procedural and statutory requirements are key to the creditor's
rights to a deficiency judgment.
The outline of the rules can be generally summarized as
follows and are explored in detail in the rest of this Article:
" If the creditor forecloses by a judicial sale, the creditor is
forbidden from pursing a deficiency unless the judicial sale
strictly complies with the judicial appraisal procedures;24
* If the creditor conducts a private sale and the security
interest is anything except a security interest under
Louisiana's version of U.C.C. articles 825 or 9,26 the
creditor is forbidden from pursuing a deficiency unless,
after default, the debtor and creditor have reached a written
agreement that meets Louisiana statutory requirements.27 A
creditor, however, cannot use "self help" to seize the
22. The Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act allows a creditor and debtor to
agree to a private sale and still obtain a deficiency judgment under certain
conditions. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4108.1, 4108.2 (2006). See also LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3165 (2009) (prior to 1990 (the effective date of Louisiana's
adoption of its version of U.C.C. article 9 by 1989 La. Acts No. 12, § 4 and
1989 La. Acts No. 135, § 12) dealt with private sales of movable items pledged
to a creditor).
23. Civil Code article 2655 defines a "giving in payment" as a "contract
whereby an obligor gives a thing to the obligee, who accepts it in payment of a
debt." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2655 (2009). This process is referred to in Louisiana by
its French term, a dation en paiement. See 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE Pt. 1, No. 522, at 291 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959) (1939).
See also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Magee, 141 So. 2d 85, 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
24. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2771. A "creditor may obtain a judgment
against the debtor for any deficiency due on the debt after the distribution of the
proceeds of the judicial sale only if the property has been sold under the
executory proceeding after appraisal in accordance with the provisions of Article
2723." Id. (emphasis added). If the creditor has proceeded by an ordinary (as
opposed to executory) proceeding, however, the judgment in the ordinary
proceeding results in personal liability for the debtor. Thus, in those instances,
the court has already declared that the debtor personally owes the money and the
sale of collateral occurs after that personal judgment.
25. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:8-101-10:8-511 (2002).
26. Id. §§ 10:9-101-10:9-710.
27. Id. § 13:4108.2.
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collateral if the debtor does not voluntarily turn it over to
the creditor. Louisiana historically has rejected "self help"
remedies by creditors2 8 except in very limited statutorily-
allowed circumstances.29
If the creditor conducts a private sale and the security
interest has been perfected under Louisiana's version of
U.C.C. articles 830 or 9,31 then the sale will be presumed to
satisfy the debt unless the creditor has proceeded by way of
a commercially reasonable sale, and in such instance the
burden of proof is on the creditor to prove that the sale was
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.
32
IV. JUDICIAL SALES
A Louisiana creditor with a mortgage, privilege, or security
interest (other than a security interest under Louisiana's versions of
U.C.C. arts. 8 or 9) has two judicial mechanisms to foreclose on
collateral in the event of debtor default--ordinary process or
executory process.
28. See Guste v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 655 So. 2d 724, 729-30 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1995), in which the court noted:
Paragraph (b) of the official comments [of Civil Code article 3279]
states, in part: The requirement that the seizure and sale must be "in the
manner provided by law" emphasizes the long tradition in Louisiana of
requiring recourse to judicial procedures and generally rejecting private
sale or self-help as a method of execution. Accordingly, it is against the
public policy of this state for mortgagor and mortgagee to incorporate
in the mortgage instrument any procedure designed to completely
bypass and waive the laws regarding foreclosure so that the mortgagor
regains title merely upon default of payment without the necessity of a
seizure and judicial sale and with the mortgagor forfeiting any claim on
the surplus remaining because of prior payment or because of
enhancement of the value of the mortgaged property.
See also Atkinson v. Sumrall, 598 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), in
which the court stated that Revised Statutes section 13:4108.1:
allows a creditor to seek a deficiency judgment against a debtor, in a
commercial transaction, even in the absence of judicial process, when
the creditor and debtor have reached an agreement as to the value to be
attributed to the property. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the statute
does not sanction self-help foreclosure, which has been intentionally
rejected in Louisiana law.
29. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4502, 9:4759 (2006), respectively
giving the repairman of movables and warehousemen the right to seize
movables, without resort to court proceedings, in anticipation of sale to satisfy
outstanding obligations.
30. Id. §§ 10:8-101-10:8-511.
31. Id. §§ 10:9-101-10:9-710.
32. Id. §§ 10:9-610, 10:9-616, 10:9-626.
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A suit by "ordinary process" entails a full-fledged lawsuit, with
all the usual and customary requirements that any lawsuit entails.
3 3
There is a petition,34 a citation35 (which must be served on the
defendant by the sheriff),36 and an opportunity for the debtor to file
an answer." The debtor may propound discovery if desired38 or
object to the procedure through dilatory,3 9 declinatory,4 ° or
peremptory exceptions. 41 Even if a defendant fails to file an answer
or exception, a judgment cannot be taken against the defendant
until the lapse of certain statutorily specified time limits.
42
In ordinary proceedings, the judgment obtained grants the
creditor a personal judgment against the debtor, collectable out of
all of the debtor's assets and, if the creditor has requested this in its
petition, recognizes the validity of the creditor's security interest.
Once this judgment in an ordinary proceeding has been obtained
the creditor may (1) have the court issue a writ to seize43 and sellT4
33. Ordinary proceedings are discussed extensively in Book II of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. It encompasses articles 851 to 2031. A full
discussion of the procedural rules is beyond the scope of this Article; for a more
detailed discussion of Louisiana procedural requirements on ordinary lawsuits,
see FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 5-10, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 125-363 (2008).
34. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 852, 891-893 (2009).
35. Id. art. 1201.
36. Id. art. 1291 (directing that service "shall be made by the sheriff of the
parish where service is to be made or of the parish where the action is pending").
Code of Civil Procedure article 1201 states that citation and service "are
essential in all civil actions except ... executory proceedings .... Without them
all proceedings are absolutely null."
37. Id. arts. 1001-1006 (governing answers to petitions).
38. Id. arts. 1420-1475.
39. Id. art. 926.
40. Id. art. 925.
41. Id. art. 927.
42. Code of Civil Procedure article 1001 requires defendants to file their
answer within fifteen days of service of citation; failure to do so cuts off certain
procedural defenses. See id. art. 928.
Article 1002 provides that, notwithstanding the fifteen day answer delay, a
defendant may file an answer at any time prior to confirmation of a default
judgment. Code of Civil Procedure articles 1701 to 1704 address the process of
entering and confirming a default judgment. Article 1701 provides that when the
defendant fails to file an answer within the delay allowed, the plaintiff may
obtain a judgment of default on written or oral motion before the court. Article
1702 provides that a judgment of default may be confirmed two days, exclusive
of holidays, after entry of a judgment of default provided that proof of demand
to prove a primafacie case has been submitted.
43. The seizure is executed through a writ offieri facias. The writ offieri
facias is discussed at Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2291.
44. LA. CODE C1V. PROC. arts. 2331-2343 (addressing the requirements of
the judicial sale under the writ offierifacias).
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the property to which the security interest attaches and (2) record
the personal judgment in the mortgage records, transforming the
personal judgment into a judicial mortgage affecting all of the
debtor's presently owned property in that parish as well as all
property the debtor may later acquire in that parish.45
Executory process, by contrast, is a pre-judgment remedy.46
Executory process begins with the filing of a special kind of
lawsuit- there is no citation and no service of process on the
debtor. 47 The creditor, with proper paperwork attached to the suit,
48
45. Civil Code article 3284 provides that a judicial mortgage "is established
by law to secure a judgment." The judicial mortgage is created by "filing a
judgment with the recorder of mortgages." LA. Clv. CODE art. 3300 (2009).
Article 3302 directs that the judicial mortgage burdens "all the property of the
obligor that is made susceptible of mortgage" by law. The effect of the mortgage
is limited to property encompassed within the Parish where the judgment is
filed. The judicial mortgage is a general mortgage. Article 3303 explains that,
once recorded in a parish, the mortgage encumbers all property owned by the
judgment debtor at the time of its creation as well as all future property of the
obligor upon acquisition. A non-Louisiana judgment can create a judicial
mortgage only after statutory procedures are followed to make the non-
Louisiana judgment recognized as a Louisiana judgment. LA. CIV. CODE art.
3305 (2003).
46. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2631. The article states that executory
proceedings are "those which are used to effect the seizure and sale of property,
without previous citation and judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege
thereon evidenced by an authentic act importing a confession of judgment, and
in other cases allowed by law." Id.
47. Id. art. 2631. See also id. art. 2640 (stating that citation "is not necessary
in an executory proceeding").
48. A petition for executory process must comply with the general
requirements for petitions, but be "accompanied by sufficient written proof that
the creditor is entitled to ... executory process." 1 A FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 3.3, in 1A LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 36 (2005). See also
LA. CODE CV. PROC. art. 2635.
In addition, attached to the petition must be certain statutorily required
evidence (LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art 2634), some of which must be in "authentic
form." A document in Louisiana is in authentic form if it is executed in the
presence of a notary and two witnesses. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1833 (2009).
Pursuant to Civil Procedure article 2635, attached to the executory process
petition must be: (1) "authentic evidence" of the "note, bond, or other instrument
evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage, security agreement or
privilege" (although the note need not be in authentic form if it is paraphed for
identification with the mortgage (LA. CODE Crv. PROC. art 2636) or, in the event
the note was not paraphed, there is an affidavit by the creditor (LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:5555 (2007)); and (2) the authentic act of mortgage or privilege on
immovable property importing a confession of judgment. A "paraph" is a
flourish at the end of a signature (think of how John Hancock signed the
Declaration of Independence); in Louisiana law, however, a "paraph" is a
mechanism used by a notary public to identify a note (held by the creditor) with
a mortgage (which is to be recorded in the mortgage records). The usual form of
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can obtain an immediate judgment that orders the seizure and sale
of the property, although the judgment is only against the property
and does not constitute a personal judgment against the debtor.
Thus, the executory process judgment is "in rem": it allows only
for the seizure and sale of property and does not determine whether
the debtor is personally liable on the debt.49 Executory process is
substantially faster than ordinary process5° and limits the types of
defenses a debtor may raise.
51
a paraph is a statement on the note reading: "Ne Varietur for identification with
an Act of Mortgage passed before me this _ day of , 20_," followed by the
notary's signature.
If the security interest is on movable property, the security document must
contain a confession of judgment but need not be in authentic form. If the
security interest is made pursuant to U.C.C. article 9, it need not be executed or
acknowledged before a notary. See LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art. 2636(5); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-629 (2002).
49. Code of Civil Procedure article 2638 directs that an order of seizure and
sale issue as opposed to requiring entry ofjudgment.
50. As noted, under ordinary process the creditor must file its petition, and
have the debtor cited and served with the judicial demand.
There typically is some delay between the period of time that the petition is
filed and the sheriff receives the request for service. In practice, a creditor can
expect a week or more to elapse between the time its petition is filed and the
debtor is served and cited. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1201-1314. After service,
the debtor has fifteen days to file an answer (id. art. 1001) if there have been no
extensions are granted by the trial court or allowed by counsel for the creditor.
In the event that an answer is not timely filed, the creditor may seek a judgment
of default. Id. art. 1701. Two days later, exclusive of holidays, the preliminary
default judgment may be confirmed. Id. arts. 1202, 1702.1.
After judgment is entered, the debtor has a seven day window within which
to new trial. Id. art. 1974. The debtor has thirty days from the expiration of the
new trial delays (or the denial of a timely motion for new trial) to seek a
suspensive appeal. Id. art. 2123. Only after the suspensive appeal delays have
run can a creditor begin to execute on the judgment. Thus, under the best case
scenario where no delays were encountered by the creditor (a situation that any
practicing attorney will agree rarely, if ever, occurs) a creditor can expect to
execute on its judgment no sooner than three months after filing a lawsuit. Only
at this point can the creditor seek a writ of seizure and sale from the Sheriff. In
general, the delay between seeking seizure and the eventual sale of collateral
and distribution of proceeds must be a minimum of thirty days for immovable
property because of the requirements that the sale be advertised twice, with the
first advertisement occurring at least thirty days prior to the judicial sale. Id. art.
2331; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:203 (2007). In reality, the delay from the time
the writ of seizure reaches the sheriff's office until the judicial sale is held is a
minimum of forty-five days and often takes longer.
As a practical matter, the time from filing of suit through judicial sale
(assuming that the debtor does not file an answer and the default judgment is not
appealed) takes between three to five months. Because most creditors do not file
suit the instant that a debtor defaults, it can be presumed that a creditor
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Until 2001, executory process had an additional advantage,
particularly if the creditor was over-secured. If the value of the
asset exceeded the outstanding debt, creditors who wished to
proceed rapidly would use executory process. Not only were
executory procedural delays truncated in comparison to ordinary
proceedings, but the law also provided that a creditor could
proceed with a sale of the collateral with or without appraisal.52 In
other words, a creditor was given the option in executory
proceedings of obtaining an immediate judgment and a quick sale
of the collateral in exchange for voluntarily forgoing any chance of
a deficiency if the creditor's pre-judgment evaluation of the
collateral's value was wrong. Of course, the creditor could always
proceed by executory process with appraisal and preserve the right
to seek a deficiency.
Prior to 2001, there was no mechanism in the slower, ordinary
process suit to sell the asset without appraisal. Sales without
appraisal cost less, 53 and executory proceedings in general are far
proceeding through ordinary process can expect at least a six month or more
delay in obtaining a foreclosure from the time the debtor defaults. Conversely,
creditors proceeding by executory process need only file their petition for
executory process with the trial court. If the petition contains the proper
documentation, the creditor is entitled to an immediate court order directing the
sheriff to seize and sell the collateral securing the debt. As noted above, the
delay between seizure and sale is usually a minimum of forty-five days.
Comparing the two methods (ordinary and executory), it is apparent that
executory proceedings result in a far more expeditious seizure and sale of the
property (although the executory judgment is in rem only and does determine
whether the debtor is personally liable on the debt)
51. Code of Civil Procedure article 2642 limits the defenses available to the
debtor to (1) injunction of seizure and sale, and (2) a suspensive appeal of the
order of seizure and sale. Code of Civil Procedure article 2751 further limits the
grounds for granting an injunction to claims that (1) the debt is extinguished, (2)
the privilege is unenforceable, or (3) the incorrect procedure was followed.
52. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2723 provides that "property
seized must be appraised . . . unless appraisal has been waived in the act
evidencing the mortgage." Usually, all mortgages contain a clause in which the
debtor waives the appraisal requirement; this allows the creditor the option to
proceed with or without appraisal.
53. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4363 (2006), directing the creditor and
judgment debtor to
name an appraiser to value the property and to notify the sheriff of his
appointment . . . prior to the time of the sale. The appraisal of the
debtor and seizing creditor shall be made and delivered to the sheriff at
least two days, exclusive of holidays, prior to the time of the sale. If
there are two or more debtors or seizing creditors and these parties
cannot agree as to which should act as or appoint an appraiser, and in
any case where an appraisal is required prior to the judicial sale and
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less expensive than ordinary proceedings with the concomitant
waves of discovery, depositions, and motion practice. In 2001,
however, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Code of Civil
Procedure to allow the creditor in an ordinary proceeding (which
results in a personal judgment) to sell the property without
appraisal.54 To date, there has been no reported case interpreting
this statutory change. It remains to be seen whether a creditor who
obtains a judgment by ordinary process and then seeks a judicial
sale without appraisal will be held to have waived the right to a
deficiency 5judgment or will be held to be entitled to seek the
deficiency.
which is not otherwise provided for in this Section, on the ex parte
application of the sheriff or of any interested party, the court shall
designate the party to act as or appoint the appraiser.
Thus, it is apparent that prior to any judicial sale with appraisal, the creditor
must incur the costs of employing an appraiser to give an appraisal of the seized
property. In addition, even if the debtor does not appoint an appraiser, the sheriff
must appoint one for the debtor (id. § 13:4363-13:4364), and if the creditor's
and debtor's appraisals differ by more than $250,000, a third appraiser is
appointed (id. § 13:4365). The costs of these appointed appraisers are
incorporated into the cost of conducting the sale and debited from the amount
realized after disposition of the property.
54. 2001 La. Acts No. 588 (effective Aug. 15, 2001). The Act amended
Code of Civil Procedure article 2332, which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows (additions are italicized):
The property seized must be appraised according to law prior to the sale.
However when the property seized is subject to a mortgage, security
agreement, or other document creating a privilege in which the debtor
has waived the right to appraisal and the judgment recites that the right
of the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment is limited to the
collateral or security for the amount of such judgment, there shall be no
requirement that the property seized be appraised prior to the sale.
55. The argument in favor of excluding a deficiency judgment following a
sale without appraisal in ordinary proceedings is that the text of the Deficiency
Judgment Act does not distinguish between executory and ordinary proceedings.
It states:
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a mortgagee or other creditor
takes advantage of a waiver of appraisement of his property, movable,
immovable, or both, by a debtor, and the proceeds of the judicial sale
thereof are insufficient to satisfy the debt for which the property was
sold, the debt nevertheless shall stand fully satisfied and discharged
insofar as it constitutes a personal obligation of the debtor ....
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106(A) (emphasis added).
Cf Guar. Bank of Mamou v. Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1067, 1070 (La.
1987) (involving a deficiency claim against sureties rather than the debtor). The
Guaranty Bank of Mamou case is discussed further in infra note 57.
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V. THE ORIGINS OF LOUISIANA'S DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EXECUTORY PROCESS
An understanding of the technical rules governing executory
process is critical, because although the Louisiana Deficiencg
Judgment Act predated the procedural rules on executory process,
Louisiana courts have traditionally linked the two concepts.57
The Deficiency Judgment Act originated in Act No. 28 of 1934
and was amended in 1952,58 in 1960,' 9 and again in the late
1980s. 60 Although there appears to be no extant legislative history
explaining the purpose of the Act, it arose during the heights of the
Great Depression and obviously was designed to prevent a creditor
56. The Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act arose in the 1930s; however,
Louisiana's rules concerning executory process date back to the 1800s. See
Henry McMahon, The Historical Development of Executory Procedure in
Louisiana, 32 TUL. L. REv. 555, 567 (1958). As early as 1825, decisions noted
the importance of authentic acts if property was to be taken without citation and
service of process. See Nichol v. De Ende, 3 Mart.(n.s.) 310, 1825 WL 1283, at
*2 (La. 1825):
It does seem somewhat hard to seize and sell a man's property without
calling him in judgment, and that the sheriffs levy should be the first
notice to him that he has failed to comply with his contract. But such is
the legal effect of a mortgage contract, and he ought to have considered
the consequence before he bound himself with such solemnity. Besides
a man is not supposed to be absent from or inattentive to his property;
and if any irregularity or illegality take place in this extraordinary mode
of immediate execution, the order of the judge, on proper application,
would be suspended; or in all events a defendant in execution could
bring his cause before the tribunals of the state so as to have his rights
investigated, as in ordinary suits.
57. See, e.g., Guar. Bank of Mamou, 502 So. 2d at 1070: "The [Deficiency
Judgment Act] is located in Chapter 21 of Title 13 of the Revised Statutes
entitled 'Executory Process.' Although it does not expressly limit its provisions
to executory proceedings, a close reading of its provisions reveals its intent to
apply to situations in which executory proceedings are used." This case,
however, did not involve a deficiency judgment claim against the debtor, but
rather against sureties, and the case arose prior to the 2001 amendment of Code
of Civil Procedure article 2332 allowing sales without appraisals in ordinary
proceedings. Thus, it remains to be seen whether courts today will treat the
language of this case as merely dicta. When the Deficiency Judgment Act was
passed, the Revised Statutes had not been created (they did not come into
existence until 1950), and the placement of the Deficiency Judgment Act in the
same section of the Revised Statutes dealing with deficiency judgments was a
result of the Louisiana Law Institute's actions, not an explicit legislative linking
of executory process and deficiency judgments. On the other hand, at the time
the Deficiency Judgment Act was created, there was no mechanism to foreclose
without appraisal by ordinary process.
58. 1952 La. Acts No. 20.
59. 1960 La. Acts No. 32.
60. 1989 La. Acts No. 137.
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from foreclosing on a debtor's collateral, buying the collateral at
the sheriff's sale, attributing nothing from the bid price towards the
debt, and then pursuing the debtor for the remaining outstanding
debt, allowing the creditor to obtain a windfall by attempting to
collect the entire debt and keep all the collateral if the creditor was
the successful bidder at the sheriffs sale.
6 1
The Deficiency Judgment Act contains express language that
prohibits parties from circumventing it. The statute proclaims that
it "declares a public policy and the provisions thereof can not, and
shall not be waived by a debtor." 62 Although the text of the
Louisiana Deficiency Judnent Act refers only to sales by judicial
process without appraisal, shortly after the Deficiency Judgment
Act was adopted, Louisiana courts began holding that any non-
judicial sale also bars a deficiency judgment.64
The strong link between executory process and deficiency
judgments is understandable. That is because in executory process
a creditor may choose to collect only from the collateral (by
foreclosing without appraisal), or may collect first from the
collateral by a judicial sale with appraisal and then seek to obtain
the balance due from the debtor (the "deficiency judgment"). The
combination between the strong public policy represented by the
Deficiency Judgment Act and the fact that executory process
results in an immediate judgment without citation or service of
process led to a series of cases holding that it was not only a lack
of appraisal that would bar a deficiency in executory proceedings,
61. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted, "Unquestionably this act
was enacted for the benefit and protection of the mortgage debtor
Southland Inv. Co. v. Motor Sales Co., 5 So. 2d 324, 326 (La. 1941).
62. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4107 (2006). The Act, however, only applies
"to mortgages, contracts, debts or other obligations made, or arising on or after
August 1, 1934." Id.
63. The pertinent language of the act is quoted in full at supra note 55.
64. The preeminent case is Home Finance Service v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1937), decided shortly after the enactment of the Deficiency
Judgment Act. Walmsley held that a non-judicial sale bars a deficiency:
While the statute under consideration refers particularly to judicial sales
without appraisement, we are of the opinion that the statement of the
public policy therein is sufficiently broad to disclose that it was the
intention of the lawmakers to place a stamp of disapproval on any
practice whereby encumbered property is sold without judicial
appraisement, and to sanction the type of agreement, such as the one
before us, would be to allow the employment of a device calculated to
defeat the underlying purposes which prompted the passage of the law.
Id. at 417.
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but also that any "fundamental, 65 defect in the executory
proceedings would bar a deficiency even if there was an appraisal.
Therefore, creditors who invoked executory process used to
proceed at their peril, even if they sought to foreclose with
appraisal. Debtors' counsel understandably would refuse to raise
defenses at the time of the executory process foreclosure because,
if defenses were raised at this stage, the creditor had the option of
converting the executory process suit into an ordinary process suit
or to amend and correct the deficiencies. 66 Debtors' counsel
realized that as long as the "fundamental defect" rule continued,
there was no advantage to raising a potential defect during the
executory proceedings. It made much more sense for debtors to
wait until after the foreclosure sale when the creditor either
converted the executory proceedings into an ordinary process suit
to obtain the deficiency judgment or filed a separate suit for the
deficiency judgment. Then and only then would many debtors
point out the alleged "fundamental" defect. If the debtors were
wrong and no "fundamental" defect was found, the debtors were
no worse off than if they had raised the issue during the executory
proceedings-they would be liable for the deficiency. On the other
hand, the deficiency judgment would be barred if debtors were
able to convince a court that the now-comgleted executory
proceeding contained a fundamental defect. 7  Further, the
jurisprudential rules on "fundamental" defects were so strong that
if the creditor was the successful bidder on the property at the
sheriff's sale, the defect could be raised to invalidate the creditor's
purchase of the collateral at the sheriffs sale.
6 8
A spiraling round of jurisprudence and inter-related statutes
developed in which courts would hold certain items were defects,
69
the legislature would amend or create statutes to allow executory
process and a deficiency judgment despite this defect, and then
courts would discover other substantial defects that would bar a
deficiency. Many of these matters arose in trial court (not
appellate) decisions, but the impact of changes in legislation was
65. Reed v. Meaux, 292 So. 2d 557 (La. 1973); Cent. Credit Union v.
Montgomery, 207 So. 2d 762 (La. 1968); Samuel Blaize, Civil Procedure-
Deficiency Judgment After Invalid Executory Process, 29 LA. L. REV. 405 (1969).
66. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art. 2644 (2009). See also First Guar. Bank of
Hammond v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Ctr., Inc., 529 So. 2d 834, 843 (La. 1987);
Dixie Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Walter, 557 So. 2d 1044 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990)
(where the creditor was allowed to amend its petition and add authentic evidence
to correct deficiencies in executory process petition).
67. See the cases cited and accompanying text at supra notes 65-66.
68. See Doherty v. Randazzo, 128 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
69. See discussion in infra notes 71, 73, and 75-77.
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clear; they were intended to make executory process less technical.
Examples of potential "fundamental defects" cured by legislation
or later jurisprudence include: discrepancies between the amount
of attorney's fees on the note and the mortgage; 70 discrepancies
between the description of the note in the mortgage and the note
itself e1 discrepancies between the interest rate on the note and the
mortgage; discrepancies between the language of the petition's
description of the note and the note itself;73 the lack of a note
paraphed for identification with the mortgage; 74 documents that
were not in authentic form;75 petitions that were not properly
verified; 76 and other technical formalities.
77
70. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2635(B) (2002), as amended by
1981 La. Acts No. 210, § 1.
71. See id. The language of the opening paragraph previously read: "The
plaintiff shall submit with his petition the authentic evidence necessary to prove
his right to use executory process to enforce the mortgage or privilege. These
exhibits shall include authentic evidence of: .... "
The Act changed this opening paragraph to read: "In order for a plaintiff to
prove his right to use executory process to enforce the mortgage, security
agreement, or privilege, it is necessary only for the plaintiff to submit with his
petition authentic evidence of: .... " Id. (emphasis added). See also Myrtle
Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 76 So. 2d 305 (La. 1954) (holding that this type of
discrepancy prevented a deficiency judgment).
72. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2635(B) (2002), as amended by
1989 Acts 137, § 18. See also supra note 71.
73. Margolis v. Allen Mortgage & Loan Corp., 268 So. 2d 714 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1972).
74. See 1992 La. Acts No. 1132.
75. League Cent. Credit Union v. Montgomery, 207 So. 2d 762 (La. 1968);
Wash. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hodge, 495 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986)
(clerk of court's certificate found inadequate); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Walker,
488 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:3733 (2006), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 478, § 1; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:4102(D) (2006), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 855. Finally, note
the change in the language of LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2635 (2002), as
amended by 1989 Acts No. 137, § 18, to change the requirements that
everything be in authentic form to requiring that only certain specified
documents be in authentic form.
76. Bank of Coushatta v. King, 522 So. 2d 1328 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988)
(affidavit merely adopting allegations in petition without any additional
information regarding breach or entitlement to executory process not properly
verified). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs, 531 So. 2d 463 (La.
1988), the decision was set aside, and the supreme court reversed and remanded
in light of First Guaranty Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center, Inc., 529 So.
2d 834 (La. 1988) (on rehearing).
77. See Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n v. Winston, 517 So. 2d 1220 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1987) (failure to attach procuration was defect providing defense
to deficiency judgment action); Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Majors, 467 So.
2d 1251 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (failure to appraise with minuteness all six
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The "fundamental defect" line of jurisprudence seemed to
come to an abrupt halt when the Louisiana Supreme Court decided
Baton Rouge Petroleum,78 which, overruling a prior decision of the
Supreme Court,79 held that a debtor in executory proceedings must
raise all defenses during the executory proceeding itself.80 Failure
of debtors to raise defenses in the executory proceeding prevented
them from raising those defenses in any subsequent action to
collect on a deficiency judgment. The Baton Rouge Petroleum
holding has sometimes been referred to as the "raise it or waive it"
rule, for if the defense is not raised in the executory process suit, it
is waived for the purposes of defending against a deficiency
judgment. 81 Thus, Baton Rouge Petroleum presented creditors with
protection against debtors who could have raised defenses but
failed to do so in the executory proceedings.
The defect that existed in Baton Rouge Petroleum was not
insignificant. The creditor had failed to attach to the executory
process petition proper evidence of the corporate authority of the
debtor to execute the mortgage, although a resolution had been
passed and had been recorded in the mortgage records. 82 Normally,
this kind of defect would have been caught by a judge in
examining the executory process papers, but apparently it was
parcels of land encumbered by mortgage fundamental defect); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Stout, 404 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (failure to sufficiently
allege default entitling creditor to executory process).
78. Baton Rouge Petroleum, 529 So. 2d 834.
79. Baton Rouge Petroleum expressly overruled League Central Credit
Union v. Montgomery, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968).
80. 529 So. 2d at 844.
8 1. As Baton Rouge Petroleum explained:
If the debtor diligently and successfully asserts such a defense in the
executory proceeding, he usually cannot defeat the creditors rights. The
creditor is expressly authorized to convert the executory proceeding
into an ordinary proceeding wherein he may obtain a judgment for the
full amount due and enforce his mortgage on the property. On the other
hand, in League Central, the debtor who neglects to raise an authentic
evidence defense in the executory proceeding may use it in the
deficiency action to completely defeat the creditor's right to the balance
of the debt due. There does not appear to be any reason in law or logic
that the diligent debtor should be penalized for exercising the defenses
in the manner specifically provided by law, i.e, by appeal or injunction.
Moreover, the legislative history of the Deficiency Judgment Act
indicates no intention to include within its safeguards a defense based
upon improper authentic evidence filed in the executory proceeding.
Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
82. See id. at 835.
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not.83 Nonetheless, because the supreme court deemed that this
defect was obvious on the face of the pleadings and could be easily
ascertained by the debtor and raised as a defense to halt the
executory proceedings, the debtor lost the right to raise the defense
when the creditor sought to obtain a deficiency judgment.
The holding of Baton Rouge Petroleum, however, was based
upon the explicit assumption that although there were apparent
defects in the executory proceedings, the appraisal was valid.84
This qualification left an opening for a new round of challenges on
deficiency judgments. Cases developed where debtors claimed
that, although the executory proceedings were valid, the appraisal
was improper, and because the appraisal was improper, the
deficiency judgment remedy was barred.
In a series of cases spanning more than a decade, courts
explored the parameters of these improper appraisal claims. The
83. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider due process issues;
however, it should be noted that executory proceedings result in a pre-judgment
seizure through state action and therefore must comply with U.S. Constitutional
due process principles. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that executory
proceedings are constitutional. See Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La.
1973). Buckner, however, was decided under the rules that Baton Rouge
Petroleum overturned-namely, that any substantial or fundamental defect in
executory proceedings would bar a deficiency. Further, after Buckner the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), a case
involving Louisiana sequestration procedures. Mitchell emphasized that a key
fact which allows pre-judgment seizures to be valid is the existence of a neutral
judicial official who evaluates the evidence presented: "Moreover, in the parish
where this case arose, the requisite showing must be made to a judge, and
judicial authorization obtained. Mitchell was not at the unsupervised mercy of
the creditor and court functionaries. The Louisiana law provides for judicial
control of the process from beginning to end." Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
This language echoes the admonition in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), that "[t]he minimal deterrent effect of a bond requirement is, in a
practical sense, no substitute for an informed evaluation by a neutral official."
Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
Thus, one unanswered question that might arise from a broad reading of
Baton Rouge Petroleum excusing a creditor from arguably defective executory
process pleadings is whether Louisiana law today accords with due process
when a court routinely fails to notice missing documents that statutes mandate
be attached to the petition and presented to the court in order to obtain a
judgment in the executory proceedings.
84. In Baton Rouge Petroleum, the court explained:
Although [the Deficiency Judgment Act] policy is broad and
strong, there is nothing in its history or expressions that indicates
an intention to bar a creditor who fully complies with appraisal
requirements from obtaining a deficiency judgment simply
because of a lack of authentic evidence in the executory
proceeding.
529 So. 2d at 844 (emphasis added).
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courts rejected claims that the appraisals were too low, 5 that the
appraiser was unqualified, 6 that there was a "windshield"
appraisal (a situation where the appraiser never exited the car to
look inside the building), 7 or that the property was appraised as a
combination of tracts rather than as individual tracts.
The general rationale of these cases is that, unless the debtor
can show significant damage because of the purported improper
appraisal, the debtor cannot rely on an allegation of an improper
appraisal to bar the creditor's subsequent pursuit of a deficiency
judgment.89 In practice, this test is almost impossible to meet
because, under Louisiana rules, both the creditor and the debtor
have a right to appoint an appraiser.90 Once a foreclosure judgment
is rendered, the sheriff notifies the parties of their need to appoint
85. See, e.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 627 So. 2d 705, 707 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1993) (where the court granted creditor's summary judgment in
deficiency, despite debtor's allegation that, among other things, appraisal was
too low; the court noting that whether "the property's value was higher at an
earlier time does not create a factual issue as to its value at the time of the
seizure and sale"); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. F.W.F., Inc., 635 So. 2d 361 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1994) (decided a few months later, where debtor's allegation that
failure to appraise movables with minuteness resulted in an allegedly too low
appraisal was found insufficient to bar deficiency judgment).
86. See Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Price, 688 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1996). On rehearing, the Court adopted the dissenting opinion and found that a
deficiency was not barred even though the appraiser was actually a loan officer for
the foreclosing Bank who was not formally trained as an appraiser. Id. at 552.
87. Id. The court rejected the claim that an appraisal was defective even
though the appraiser never entered the house he was appraising.
88. Williams v. Perkins-Siegen P'ship, 649 So. 2d 367 (La. 1995) (on
rehearing) (reversing a trial court finding that deficiency was barred where
creditor appraised as a group three parcels subject to a mortgage rather than
appraising each parcel independently). See also Commercial Nat'l Bank v.
Succession of Rogers, 628 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
89. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 688 So. 2d at 543 (reversed on rehearing
adopting dissent) ("[S]he who asserts the lack of qualifications of the appraisers
bears a burden of proof which the case law has consistently said to be heavy or
substantial burden. A debtor's mere supposition or argument that the appraisal
is or was unfairly or unjustly prejudicial to the debtor.., without some evidence
to establish that fact, will not be deemed to satisfy the substantial burden of
proof and rebut the presumption that the sale was conducted as the law directs.")
(citations omitted). See also Whitney Nat'l Bank, 635 So. 2d at 365 ("When
there has been substantial compliance with [the executory process procedures],
i.e. no deviations shown to be or obviously prejudicial to a material degree, then
there is at least a very strong presumption, perhaps even a conclusive
presumption, that the results of the appraisal process are correct. It is thus very
difficult, it if is possible at all, for the debtor to defeat a claim for deficiency
judgment simply by arguing that the appraisal amount used in the executory
process judicial sale was wrong. .. ").
90. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4363 (1982).
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an appraiser.91 If one (or both) does not timely appoint an
appraiser, the sheriff appoints one for them.92 If both appoint an
appraiser and the appraisals differ by less than $250,000, the
appraisal for the purposes of the foreclosure proceedings becomes
the average of the two. 93 Only in the event that the difference in
appraisals is more than $250,000 is a third appraiser appointed; 94
in that instance, the third appraiser is appointed by the sheriff and
that third appraisal becomes the value for the foreclosure sale. 95 In
this situation, the minimum bid is two-thirds of the value reflected
by the third appraisal.
As the cases show, as a practical matter a debtor who fails to
appoint an appraiser under the statute bears a difficult burden of
proving prejudice. The implication from the jurisprudence appears
to be that if the debtors had appointed their own appraisers, those
appraisals would have shown the "true value" of the property and
thus the ultimate number used as the basis for the two-thirds rule
would be higher. 96 The underlying assumption of these cases (often
91. Louisiana Revised States section 13:4363 states that within seven days,
exclusive of holidays, before the sale of seized property, the sheriff shall serve
written notice on the debtor and on the seizing creditor, in the manner provided
for the service of a citation, directing each to name an appraiser to value the
property and to notify the sheriff of his appointment prior to the time stated in
the notice, which shall be at least four days, exclusive of holidays, prior to the
time of the sale. The appraisal of the debtor and seizing creditor shall be made
and delivered to the sheriff at least two days, exclusive of holidays, prior to the
time of the sale.
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4364 (1986).
93. Louisiana Revised States section 13:4365(B) states that if
appraisers cannot agree, and (1) the difference in value between the two
appraisals does not exceed two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and
(2) the value assigned by the lower of the two appraisers is at least
ninety percent of the value assigned by the higher of the two appraisers,
then the sheriff shall average the two figures and use the average as the
appraised value for purposes of determining the opening bid. In those
cases where the two appraisers do not agree and the values are not
within the averaging limits, then the sheriff shall appoint a third
appraiser, who shall also be sworn, and whose decision shall be final.
94. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4365 (1987).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. F.W.F., Inc., 635 So. 2d 361 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 642 So. 2d 1301 (La.), reconsideration denied, 644 So. 2d
1045 (La. 1994). As the fourth circuit stated:
However, when the debtor has been served with the notice of seizure and
notice to appoint appraiser, and fails to appoint an appraiser, and also
fails to object to the lack of "minuteness" of the appraisals at any time
prior to the judicial sale of the collateral property, all as in the present
case, the debtor may not complain of the lack of "minuteness" in the
appraisals as a defense to a later deficiency judgment action. A fully
notified debtor who never raises any objection to the appraisals in time
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implicit) is that the buyer at the sheriff's sale is either the foreclosing
creditor or someone who buys the property for only two-thirds of
the appraised value. If there had been spirited bidding for the
property so that the price paid at the judicial sale was higher than
two-thirds and might even approach what the debtor believes to be
the "true" fair market value, the debtor likely would not complain.
Perhaps the most basic cause of a debtor's complaint of an
improper appraisal stems from two sources. First, the debtor
usually cannot afford to bid on the property or, if so, is not the
successful bidder. Thus, the debtor loses ownership of the property
and still owes a deficiency judgment. Second, given the fact that
most debtors are not the successful bidders at sheriffs' sales, the
debtor may believe either (1) that the appraisal was too low and
therefore two-thirds of the appraisal left a larger deficiency than
was necessary, or (2) that the creditor received a windfall by both
buying the property for two-thirds of the appraised value and
collecting the deficiency on the difference.
While Baton Rouge Petroleum supposedly suppressed the
"fundamental defect" rule outside of the appraisal area, the
language of "fundamental defect" or similar terminology continues
to be used by some courts, particularly when the allegation is that
the appraisal is so defective as to bar the deficiency judgment.97 Of
course, even if the appraisal is valid, the creditor still bears the
burden of proof about the amount of the deficiency judgment. 98
for any lack of "minuteness" to be cured, i.e. prior to the judicial sale of
the collateral property, has waived the "minuteness" requirement.
Id. at 363.
97. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of New Iberia v. Moss, 616 So.
2d 648, 651 (La. 1993) ("[W]e decide that such an in globo sale [of separately
mortgaged properties] is unauthorized and that, under the circumstances of this
case, the unauthorized sale constitutes a fundamental defect in the executory
proceeding, precluding the seizing creditor from obtaining a deficiency
judgment."); Ray v. Varwig, 641 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ
denied, 648 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1995); Citicorp Acceptance Co., Inc. v. Roussell,
601 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 177 (La. 1992); Bank
of LaPlace v. Millet, 545 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 550 So. 2d
630 (La. 1989). See also Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Landry, 610 So. 2d
927, 931 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) (using the phrase "prejudicial defect"); Samco
Mortgage Corp. v. Armstrong, 579 So. 2d 521, 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991)
(using the phrase "nonprejudicial technicality").
98. In Security Homestead Federal Savings Corp. v. Ullo, 589 So. 2d 5, 7-8
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), a mortgage creditor sought summary judgment in
pursuit of deficiency, but offered no supporting evidence. The appellate court, in
holding for the debtor, noted that Baton Rouge Petroleum does not relieve a
creditor of his burden of proof in the case for a deficiency action. The law
requires that a creditor prove that a deficiency amount remains due on the debt
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Even though Baton Rouge Petroleum's "raise it or waive it"
rule and the post-Baton Rouge Petroleum appraisal cases seem to
put more burdens on the debtor to avoid the deficiency judgment,
foreclosing creditors nonetheless may wish to carefully consider all
of the procedural niceties re9uired by Louisiana procedural statutes
before seeking a deficiency.
VI. THE LOUISIANA DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT Is A PROCEDURAL
RULE
The Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act is a purely procedural
statute. The Act outlines specific procedural hurdles that a creditor
must follow in the process of foreclosing on collateral and
obtaining the proceeds to be applied to a debtor's outstanding
obligation. For example, unless a specific exemption from the
statute applies, a creditor is forbidden from pursuing a deficiency
unless there is a judicial sale of the collateral.'0° The judicial sale
must be made with appraisal,' 0' and the collateral must be sold for
at least two-thirds of its appraised value at the first sale.'0 2 Even if
the sale brings full fair market value, any other form of sale
(whether it is a private sale or a judicial sale without appraisal) that
does not comport with these requirements bars the creditor from
collecting any deficiency from the debtor'0 3 unless a specific
statutory exemption applies.
after distribution of the proceeds of the judicial sale and that the property was
sold under executory procedure after appraisal in accordance with Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure 2723.
99. See, e.g., Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Tri-Parish Ventures, Ltd., 881
F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1989), holding that a failure to strictly follow Louisiana's
procedural statutes may bar a deficiency even after the Baton Rouge Petroleum
decision. The Fifth Circuit noted that Baton Rouge Petroleum contains
phrases, admittedly in dicta, which emphasize that sale with appraisal is
a prerequisite to a deficiency judgment. While the opinion does not
mandate expressly that the debtor be given notice of the appraisal and
an opportunity to participate, the failure to accord same deprives the
debtor of the protection 'against an unjust sacrifice' of his property.
The debtor must have the right, not merely the privilege, to participate
in the appraisal of the property; actual notice of the seizure is not
enough.
100. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106 (1989).
101. Id.; LA. CODE Civ. PROC. art. 2771 (2009).
102. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106. If there are superior liens or
encumbrances, however, the minimum bid is the greater of two-thirds of the
appraised value or the amount of superior liens and encumbrances. See LA.
CODE CIrv. PROC. ANN. arts. 2336 (2001), 2337 (1989).
103. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 2336 (2001), 2724(B) (1992).
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At base, the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act reflects an
implicit assumption that a judicial sale will not necessarily bring a
fair market price for the property being sold, for if a fair market
price always could be obtained through a judicial sale, there would
be no need to have a rule requiring an appraisal or the minimum
two-thirds bid rule.
The purely procedural nature of the Deficiency Judgment Act
can be illustrated by the following examples.
Example A: A creditor is owed $300,000; the security for the debt
is a $90,000 first mortgage on a tract of land worth $90,000.
The creditor, wanting to proceed quickly and expeditiously,
privately sells the property with the debtor's consent for
$90,000 and decides, after the sale, to credit the debtor with the
full value received and to attempt to collect a deficiency for the
remaining $210,000.104 Although the creditor has given debtor
the benefit of the full value of the sale, the creditor is
nonetheless prevented from collecting anything further because
of the Deficiency Judgment Act. 105
Example B: As in Example A, a creditor is owed $300,000, and the
security for the debt is a $90,000 first mortgage on a tract of
land worth $90,000. This time, however, the creditor proceeds
by judicial process, not by a private sale, but the creditor takes
advantage of a waiver of appraisal clause in the mortgage and
has the property sold at the sheriffs sale without appraisal; the
property brings $90,000. After the sheriffs sale, the creditor
decides to credit the debtor with the full value received and then
seeks to collect a deficiency only for the remaining $210,000.
As in Example A, the debtor has received full value for the
property and the maximum credit towards the debtor's
outstanding obligation, yet, the creditor again is prohibited from
obtaining a deficiency judgment because the judicial sale was
without appraisal. 10 6 The Deficiency Judgment Act does not
consider whether the debtor has received full value for the
property but only whether the proper procedure was followed.
104. The amount still owing would be $300,000 -$90,000 = $210,000.
105. A creditor may invoke a private sale and obtain a deficiency if the
creditor complies with the special provisions of the Deficiency Judgment Act,
which require an agreement between creditor and debtor post-default but pre-
sale. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4108.1, 4108.2, as discussed in further
detail in Section X of this Paper.




Example C: A creditor is owed $300,000; the security for the debt
is a $300,000 first mortgage on a tract of land worth $300,000.
The creditor invokes an executory proceeding with appraisal-
the property sells for two-thirds of its appraised value1
°7
($200,000) at the first sale. In this instance, the creditor would
be entitled to keep the $200,000 in sales' proceeds and still
pursue the debtor personally'0 8  for a deficiency of a
$ 100,000.109 In this instance the creditor would be entitled to be
made whole.
10
Comments on Examples A, B, and C: In practice, there is
seldom serious adverse bidding at judicial sales, and experienced
practitioners will attest that, in a majority of cases, the foreclosing
creditor becomes the successful purchaser by merely bidding the
statutorily required minimum amount. With this in mind, consider
that if the foreclosing creditor in Example C was the successful
bidder (for $200,000) and became owner of the property, the
creditor would own the property (which had been appraised at
$300,000) and still be able to pursue the debtor for a $100,000
deficiency (the difference between the $300,000 debt and the
$200,000 minimum bid). Thus, the creditor would in fact be able to
107. For this example and the succeeding examples, it is assumed that the
appraised value is equal to the fair market value of the property. This
assumption is only for the purposes of the examples. It is often the case that an
appraisal submitted at a foreclosure sale may differ from the "fair market value"
(realizing, of course, that "fair market value" is only an estimate). For cases
defining "fair market value," see Shopf v. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 549 So. 2d
833 (La. 1989) (in the dissolution of partnership, the court stated that "[f]air
market value is defined generally as the price that a willing buyer would pay to a
willing seller for a certain piece of property in an arm's length transaction,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts"). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (5th ed.
1979). See, e.g., Joiner v. Abercrombie, 968 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (La. App. 2d Cir.
2007) (context of lesion); McConnico v. Red Oak Timber Co., 847 So. 2d 191,
198 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003). For authority questioning whether foreclosure
appraisals actually approach fair market value, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Home
Ownership Risk Beyond A Subprime Crisis: The Role Of Delinquency
Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2261, 2881 n.105 (2008).
108. The debtor's personal liability would be obtained when the creditor
either converted the executory proceeding to an ordinary one or filed a separate
suit for a deficiency judgment. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2644 (1960).
109. The $300,000 debt minus the $200,000 received at the judicial sale.
110. On the other hand, assume the same facts as in Example C but the
judicial sale was held without appraisal with the foreclosing creditor as the
successful bidder. Now, although the creditor bid only costs and could not get a
deficiency judgment, the creditor nonetheless has obtained ownership of
$300,000 in collateral, the exact amount of the debt.
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collect $400,000 (the creditor would have $100,000 deficiency
plus property worth $300,000 that it had bought for $200,000).1
Contrast this to the situation in Examples A and B. In both of
these examples, if the creditor had been the only bidder on the
$90,000 piece of property, the creditor receives no windfall
(because the creditor purchased the property for its exact value)
and would actually have a deficit because the foreclosure without
appraisal barred pursuit of the any portion of the debt remaining
after the sales.
As these examples illustrate, the Deficiency Judgment Act does
not consider whether the winning bid reflected the true value of the
property or the "fairness" of the result. In Examples A and B, the
creditor has acted fairly when judged objectively-the creditor has
given the debtor the full value of the mortgaged property; yet,
because the creditor has failed to follow the procedural
requirements of the Deficiency Judgment Act, the debtor is
relieved of all further liability and the creditor is barred from
pursuing the remaining $210,000 that is owed by the debtor. In
contrast, under Example C, the creditor receives a windfall by
owning (after the judicial sale) property worth $300,000 and still
maintains the right to sue the debtor for an additional $100,000. By
following the Deficiency Judgment Act strictly and by being the
only bidder at the sheriff's sale, the creditor in Example C has used
the law to collect more than the debtor owed. This result is allowed
by Louisiana law.
These comments are not intended to be a critique of the
Deficiency Judgment Act; the Act serves a salutary purpose of
forcing creditors, who control the collection process, to use judicial
procedures that are clearly set forth in statutes. In other words, the
Deficiency Judgment Act puts the onus on the creditor to act in a
procedurally proper manner and gives courts a "bright line" rule by
111. Note that the foreclosing creditor does not have to pay cash equaling the
amount of its own outstanding unpaid obligation if the creditor is the winning
bidder. The creditor uses the amount of its judgment as a credit to pay for the
item. The creditor, however, still must pay costs and sheriff's commissions;
further, the foreclosure sale does not extinguish any superior mortgages or
privileges that prime the foreclosing creditor's interests in the collateral. See
Casey v. Nat'l Info. Serv., Inc., 90 So. 2d 710, 716-17 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005)
("Where the seizing creditor submits the highest bid for the property, if the
amount of his accepted bid is the amount of his security interest plus costs, he
will simply pay the amount of costs to the sheriff. If the seizing creditor bid the
property in this manner, he would obtain it free and clear of all inferior
encumbrances."); Capital Sav. Ass'n v. Runnels, 361 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1978). See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2374 (1989) (stating that the
purchaser "shall pay to the sheriff only that portion of the sale price which
exceeds the amount of the superior security interest...").
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which to judge the creditor's actions. "Bright line" rules have the
advantage of predictability and ease of enforcement, and are often
used by legislatures even though they may lead to results that, at
the extremes, may seem less than equitable.' 12
112. Louisiana has never had the law versus equity distinction of common
law. See, e.g., Dupuis v. Becnel Co., 535 So. 2d 375, 377 (La. 1988); Babineaux
v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 262 So. 2d 328, 335 n.5 (La. 1972) (noting the
distinction of federal practice from Louisiana practice is due to the lack of such
a distinction in a civilian jurisdiction). Equity in Louisiana is a last resort only if
there is no positive law applicable. Louisiana Civil Code article 1 states that the
"sources of law are legislation and custom." Article 4 provides that where "no rule
... can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed
according to equity." LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2009). Moreover, comment (b) to
Louisiana Civil Code article 1 expressly categorizes equity as merely a
"persuasive or secondary source of law" in comparison to legislation and custom.
For example, in Louisiana, a "bright line" rule exists in real estate sales that
looks to the date the sale document is filed in the public records, not the
knowledge of the parties. If X buys land from a seller on January 1 st but does
not record the act of sale until January 3rd, and if Y buys the same land from the
seller on January 2nd and records the act on that day, knowing that X has
already signed the January 1st act of sale, Y will be seen as owner and will
trump X's rights. The fact that Y knows of X's sale, and the fact that it seems
inequitable that Y should be able to own the property to the detriment of X
merely because Y beat X in the race to the courthouse will not stop Y from
being recognized as owner. This rule is clear in Louisiana. See LA. CIv. CODE
art. 3338, stating in pertinent part:
The rights and obligations established or created by the following
written instruments are without effect as to a third person unless the
instrument is registered by recording it in the appropriate mortgage or
conveyance records pursuant to the provisions of this Title:
(1) An instrument that transfers an immovable or establishes a real right
in or over an immovable.
Thus, X's rights are not effective as to Y because his document was not
recorded when Y made and recorded his agreement. Other states may reach a
contrary result. For instance, see New York's rule regarding recordation of
conveyances, which states, in pertinent part:
A conveyance of real property ... may be recorded in the office of the
clerk of the county where such real property is situated . . . Every such
conveyance not so recorded is void as against any person who
subsequently purchases or acquires by exchange or contracts to
purchase or acquire by exchange, the same real property or any portion
thereof, . . . in good faith and for a valuable consideration, from the
same vendor.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2006) (emphasis added).
It is the "in good faith" language that is critical, and could resort in a court
looking to equitable considerations to grant the property to the previously
contracted, but unrecorded, sale. See Miles v. De Sapio, 96 A.D.2d 970, 971
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983):
Where there are conflicting claims between a prior unrecorded deed
and a subsequent purchaser, if the purchaser "has knowledge of any
fact, sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the existence of some right or
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
VII. CALCULATING THE MINIMUM BID AT THE FIRST SALE113
Although the text of the Deficiency Judgment Act concerns the
appraisal requirement," 4 other statutes must be considered to
obtain an understanding of how the appraisal rules intersect with
calculating the payment of the winning bid.'
1 5
When encumbered property is sold, a creditor who intends to
pursue a deficiency judgment must sell the property with appraisal
for the greater of two-thirds of its appraised value or the amount of
superior liens and encumbrances. T6'he reason that the amounts of
superior liens and encumbrances must be considered is that a
sheriffs sale extinguishes only rights inferior to those of the
foreclosing creditor.
The sheriffs sale does not extinguish superior security interests
or rights.' 8 A purchaser at a sheriffs sale buys the property
"subject to''119 superior liens and encumbrances, which means that
these liens and encumbrances continue to affect the property
although the purchaser has no personal liability for these debts.' Zo
Thus, immediately after a foreclosure sale, holders of superior
liens and encumbrances can immediately begin their own
foreclosure proceedings if they so choose.' 
21
The interrelationship between the two-thirds rule and the
superior lien encumbrance rule may create situations where a
creditor may not wish to bid at the first sale if no one else is
bidding. The next three examples are based on the following
hypothetical situation. Creditor A holds a $300,000 first mortgage
on property, while Creditor B holds a $100,000 second mortgage
title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, he is presumed either
to have made the inquiry, and ascertained the extent of such prior right,
or to have been guilty of a degree of negligence equally fatal to his
claim, to be considered as a bona fide purchaser.
113. This section deals with the first judicial sale; the issue of what happens
if there are no successful bidders at the first judicial sale and a second sale is
held is dealt with in Section IX of this Article.
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106 (1989).
115. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2331-2343, 2721-2725 (2009).
116. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2771, 2337 (1989).
117. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2375 (1960).
118. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art 2374 (1989) (stating that a purchaser at a
sheriffs sale buys subject to the rights of superior creditors).
119. Id.
120. See id. (stating that a purchaser buys subject to superior mortgage rights);
LA. CODE Civ. PROC. art. 2375 (1960) (stating that the purchaser is liable for nothing
beyond the purchase price). See also Thompson v. Levy, 23 So. 913 (La. 1898).
121. LA. CODE ClV. PROC. art. 2378 (1989).
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on the same tract. 122 These examples assume that B forecloses and
A does not intervene in the foreclosure proceedings;123 therefore,
the property will be purchased subject to A's mortgage. Under this
situation, and as these examples demonstrate, the minimum bid
124
at B's foreclosure sale will depend upon the amount of the
appraisal at B's foreclosure sale.
Example D: If the property appraises for $90,000, the minimum
bid is $300,000,25 the amount necessary to satisfy Creditor A's
superior mortgage.
Example E: If the property appraises for $600,000, the minimum
bid is $400,000, which is two-thirds of the appraisal amount.
This is because two-thirds of the appraised value exceeds the
amount of Creditor A's mortgage.
122. The assumption in this situation is that the face amount of each
mortgage equals the sum owing on each mortgage at the time of foreclosure. Of
course, in most situations the face amount of the mortgage differs from the pay-
off amount at the time of foreclosure, because usually the borrower has made
some payments on the mortgage which have been applied against the principal
balance.
123. Creditor A does not have to be involved in Creditor B's foreclosure or
even be given notice of it, for the judicial sale will be "subject to" Creditor's A
superior mortgage. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2374 (1989). Of course, Creditor A
could choose to intervene into the executory proceedings. Id. arts. 1092 (1962),
2643 (1989). If Creditor A does intervene, then the sheriffs sale will extinguish
Creditor's A mortgage (id. arts. 2376, 2337 (1989)), and because under these
examples there are no superior liens extant other than Creditor A, the minimum
bid with Creditor A's intervention will then become only two-thirds of the
appraised value.
124. In all of these examples, the amount of sheriffs commissions is not
taken into account. The minimum bid must always be enough to pay
commissions. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2337, noting that unless "the price
offered by the highest bidder at the first or subsequent offering is not sufficient
to discharge the costs of the sale . . . the property shall not be sold." Under
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:1428(7)(a), commissions are set on the
ultimate sales price as the amount that the winning creditor receives-6% of the
price of adjudication on movables and 3% of the price of adjudication on
immovables. Under this statute, "'the price of adjudication' shall mean the
amount of the successful bid price at the sale conducted by the sheriff."
125. The minimum bid must always include costs, and costs are paid first out
of the sales proceeds. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2372, regarding distribution of
proceeds of sale, "[a]fter deducting the costs" the sheriff shall pay mortgage
holders. In none of the examples that follow, however, have the authors included
costs in the calculations, because the purpose of the illustrations is not to have a
precise calculation of all aspects of a sale but rather to illuminate particular issues
relating to minimum bids and proceeds distributions to creditors and debtors.
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Example F: If the property appraises for $1.2 million, the
minimum bid is $800,000, two-thirds of the appraisal amount,
for the same reasons as in Example E.
In both Examples E and F, although there is plenty of equity in
the property, Creditor B (who has only a $100,000 mortgage and
who is conducting the foreclosure proceedings into which Creditor
A has not intervened) 2 6 may not be anxious to make the minimum
bid because to do so would require, in essence, payment of cash to
the debtor. To understand this factor, however, one must explore
the distinction between the minimum bid and the amount that the
creditor actually pays.
VIII. WHAT A FORECLOSING CREDITOR MUST PAY IN A WINNING
BID AND How THIS RELATES TO THE MINIMUM BID AT THE FIRST
SALE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS OF THE SALE
The two-thirds minimum bid requirement of the Deficiency
Judgment Act is a separate and distinct rule from what the
foreclosing creditor must actually pay at the sheriff's sale when the
foreclosing creditor is the successful bidder and when there are
superior liens and encumbrances.
While the combination of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Deficiency Judgment Act requires that there be a minimum bid at
the sheriffs sale equal to the greater of the superior liens and
encumbrances or two-thirds of the appraised value,' 27 the amount
that the foreclosing creditor must pay as a successful bidder is
calculated on an entirely different basis. The best way to explain
this is to use another series of examples. Under these examples,
Creditor L holds a $100,000 first mortgage on property and
Creditor M holds a $300,000 second mortgage on the same tract.' 28
Creditor M is the foreclosing creditor in a suit in which Creditor L
has not intervened.
Example G: If the property appraises for $120,000, the minimum
bid is $100,000. This is because two-thirds of the $120,000
126. Creditor A always has the right to intervene into the proceedings. See
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1092 (1962), 2643 (1989).
127. See the discussion in supra Section VII.
128. The assumption in this situation is that the face amount of each
mortgage equals the sum owing on each mortgage at the time of foreclosure. Of
course, in most situations the face amount of the mortgage differs from the pay-
off amount at the time of foreclosure, because usually the borrower has made




appraisal is $80,000, but the minimum bid must be enough to
cover Creditor L's $100,000 first mortgage.129
Comments on Example G: If Creditor M, the foreclosing
creditor, is the onl bidder at the sale, Creditor M must pay the
costs of the sale, but Creditor M does not pay any additional
sums. This is because Creditor M is given a credit against its
$300,000 second mortgage.' 3 ' No monies go to Creditor L,
because Creditor L has not intervened. While Creditor M's second
mortgage is extinguished by the sheriff's sale,' 32 Creditor L's
mortgage is unaffected by the sheriffs sale (the property is sold
"subject to" L's mortgage' 33). Thus, at the conclusion of the
sheriffs sale, while the minimum bid is $100,000, when Creditor
M is the successful bidder, M pays only costs.
On the other hand, had a third-party come to bid at the sale,' 34
and had Creditor M allowed the sale to go through for only the
$100,000 bid by the third party,135 then the third party would pay
129. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2337 (2009) ("If the price offered by the
highest bidder at the first or subsequent offering is not sufficient to discharge the
costs of the sale and the security interests, mortgages, liens, and privileges
superior to that of the seizing creditor, the property shall not be sold.").
130. See id. art. 2337 cmt. ("Although the source article makes no reference
to the 'costs of the sale,' it would appear that the bid has to be sufficient to pay
whatever costs are incurred over and above those advanced by the seizing
creditor. The reason for this is that the claim of a superior mortgage holder
cannot be reduced.").
131. See id. art. 2374 ("If there is a security interest, mortgage, lien, or
privilege on the property superior to that of the seizing creditor, the purchaser
shall pay to the sheriff only that portion of the sale price which exceeds the
amount of the superior security interest, mortgage, lien, or privilege."). See also
Casey v. Nat'l Info. Serv. Inc., 906 So. 2d 710, 716-17 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005).
132. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2376 ("The sheriff sale give the purchaser
a release from the security interest, mortgage, lien, or privilege of the seizing
creditor ... ").
133. Seeidart.2372.
134. The requirements of a third party coming to a sheriff sale and
submitting a bid are different than for the foreclosing creditor.
Where terms of the sale are not fixed in the order of sale, the seizing creditor
may fix the "portion of the purchase price to be paid at the moment of
adjudication. In default of such instruction, the officer may fix the amount,
which in no case shall be less than ten per cent." This portion must be stated in
the advertisement. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4359 (2006). Additionally, the full
payment take place "at the moment of the adjudication." The property must be
re-advertised under this provision if the purchaser fails to pay the full price at
adjudication, if so ordered, or to make full payment thirty days if allowed by
section 13:4359. Id. § 13:4360.
135. This situation is unlikely to occur in the real world and is used only for
illustrative purposes. This situation is unlikely because, if the property is
appraised for $120,000, Creditor L undoubtedly would have bid up to almost the
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$100,000 to the sheriff. The sheriff would then distribute the
$100,000116 to Creditor M.
Regardless of whether Creditor M or a third party was the
successful bidder in this situation, however, Creditor M must apply
the $100,000 to its loan and can now seek to sue the borrower for a
deficiency judgment of $200,000.137
Example H: If the property appraises for $300,000, the minimum
bid is now $200,000. This is because $200,000 is two-thirds of
the appraised value and also is greater than Creditor L's
$100,000 first mortgage.
Comments on Example H: If Creditor M, the foreclosing
creditor, is the only bidder at the sale, Creditor M must pay the
costs of the sale,'3 but Creditor M does not pay any additional
sums. This is because, as in Example G, Creditor M is given a
credit against its $300,000 second mortgage. 139 No monies go to
Creditor L because Creditor L has not intervened. The deficiency
that Creditor M can now seek against the borrower is $100,000. 140
If a third party is the successful bidder for $200,000,141 the
third party must pay $200,000 in cash to the Sheriff, who then
distributes the funds to Creditor M.1
42
Additional Comments on Examples G and H: As can be seen
from Examples G and H, the foreclosing creditor can use the
monies it is owed under the mortgage as a "credit" against the
purchase price and pay only the costs of sale while preserving a
full appraised value before letting the third party bidder "win" the bid, for the
higher the number at the sheriff's sale, the more money will flow from the third
party to Creditor L.
136. As noted in supra note 125, these examples do not take into account the
costs of the sale, which would otherwise have to be included in the calculation
of the proceeds distribution.
137. The loan was $300,000; the deficiency is $200,000 after applying the
$100,000 from the sheriff's sale.
138. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2337 (2009).
139. See id. art. 2374. See also Casey v. Nat'l Info. Serv., Inc., 906 So. 2d
710, 716-17 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005).
140. The loan was $300,000; the deficiency is $100,000 after applying the
$200,000 from the sheriffs sale.
141. As in Example G, however, it is unlikely that Creditor M will allow a
third party to be the sole bidder at $200,000. It is more likely that Creditor M
would bid the property up to or near $300,000, which is both the appraised value
of the property as well as the pay-off on Creditor M's mortgage.
142. As noted supra note 125, these examples do not take into account the
costs of the sale, which would otherwise have to be included in the calculation
of the proceeds distribution.
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deficiency against the borrower. At the same time, Creditor L's
first mortgage is unaffected because Creditor L has not intervened
in the proceedings. Thus, if the day after the sheriffs sale the
borrower defaults on its loan with Creditor L, that creditor may
immediately begin foreclosure proceedings under its mortgage; the
current owner of the property after the sheriff's sale (whether
Creditor M or a third party) will find that it will now lose the
property unless it becomes the successful bidder at Creditor L's
sheriff's sale.
Another series of examples will be useful in looking at what
happens if there is a mortgage inferior to that of the foreclosing
creditor.
A. Examples Involving a Mortgage Inferior to that of the
Foreclosing Creditor
Under these next series of examples, the facts are the same as
in Examples G and H--Creditor L holds a $100,000 first mortgage
on property and Creditor M holds a $300,000 second mortgage on
the same tract. Now, however, there is an additional creditor,
Creditor 0, who holds a $75,000 third mortgage on the same
tract. 143 In these series of examples, Creditor M is the foreclosing
creditor, while third mortgage Creditor 0 has intervened into the
foreclosure proceedings,' but first mortgage Creditor L has not.
143. As in the previous hypotheticals, the assumption is that the face amount
of each mortgage equals the sum owing on each mortgage at the time of
foreclosure.
144. Creditor 0 need not intervene to be entitled to the rights discussed in
Examples I and J because the Sheriff must distribute proceeds that exceed the
foreclosing creditor's mortgage to inferior secured creditors and then, if any
remains, to the owner of the property. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2373
(2009). In any event, however, unlike first mortgage Creditor L (who gets no
notice of second mortgage Creditor M's foreclosure proceedings because
Creditor L's mortgage is unaffected), third mortgage Creditor 0 must get notice
of the foreclosure sale. The notice to Creditor 0 is required under the procedural
due process rules set forth in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791 (1983), which requires notice to those whose property rights (including
mortgages and security interests) may be affected by a foreclosure sale. The due
process issues relating to foreclosures are beyond the scope of this Article, but
the key cases include: Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Davis Oil Co. v.
Mills, 873 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1989); Small Engine Shop v. Cascio, 878 F.2d 883
(5th Cir. 1989); Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987).
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Example I: If the property appraises for $240,000,145 the minimum
bid is now $160,000. This is because the $160,000 two-thirds
amount is greater than Creditor L's $100,000 first mortgage.
Comment on Example I: If Creditor M, the foreclosing creditor,
is the only bidder at the sale, Creditor M must pay the costs of the
sale 146 but no other cash, because Creditor M is given a credit
against its $300,000 second mortgage. No money is distributed to
third mortgage Creditor 0, because the sale's proceeds are not
sufficient to pay off the mortgage of foreclosing Creditor M, and
no money is distributed to first mortgage Creditor L, because L has
not filed an intervention in the proceedings and its mortgage is
unaffected by the foreclosure sale.
Following the sheriffs sale, second mortgage Creditor M may
pursue the debtor for a deficiency of $60,000 (the difference
between the minimum bid of $240,000 and the payoff of the
$300,000 mortgage held by Creditor M); third mortgage Creditor
0 may pursue the debtor for a deficiency of $75,000 (because no
sales proceeds were attributable to Creditor O's mortgage); and
first mortgage Creditor L is completely unaffected.
If a third party had been the successful bidder at this sale and
had bid $240,000, the third party would have paid the sheriff
$240,000,147 from which the sheriff would distribute $240,000 to
Creditor M and nothing to Creditors 0 or L. Creditor 0 gets
nothing because all the $240,000 went to Creditor M. Creditor L
gets nothing because it has not intervened in the sale; however,
because the sale did not affect Creditor L's mortgage, Creditor L
may begin its own foreclosure proceedings if the debtor defaults in
its obligations to Creditor L.
Example J: If the property appraises for $600,000, the minimum
bid is now $400,000. This is because that $400,000 is two-
thirds of the appraised value and is greater than Creditor L's
$100,000 first mortgage.
145. In this example, the property is encumbered for $475,000, but is worth
at the time of foreclosure only $240,000. The situation, however, is not
unrealistic. Many properties following the devastation wrought by Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, Ike, and Gustav were worth far less following the storms than they
were prior to the storms. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted "the
inadequacy of words to describe the total devastation of property, community
and social structures which are the after-effects of these historic storms." State v.
All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers, 937 So. 2d 313, 326 (La. 2006).
146. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2337 (2009).
147. As noted supra note 125, these examples do not take into account the
costs of the sale, which would otherwise have to be included in the calculation
of the proceeds distribution.
818 [Vol. 69
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
Comments on Example J. If Creditor M, the foreclosing
creditor, is the only bidder at the sale, Creditor M must pay the
sheriff $100,000 in cash. 148 This is because, while Creditor M is
given a credit against its $300,000 second mortgage, 149 the
minimum bid now exceeds its mortgage, and it must pay the sheriff
$100,000 (the difference between the $300,000 second mortgage
which Creditor M holds and the minimum bid of $400,000).
The sheriff does not distribute any of the $100,000 in cash to the
first mortgage holder Creditor L, because Creditor L has not
intervened and its mortgage is unaffected by the sale. The sheriff
instead distributes $75,000 to third mortgage Creditor 0, whose
mortgage is being extinguished in the sheriff's sale. 150 This $75,000
fully pays off Creditor O's mortgage. The remaining $25,000 of the
$100,000 in cash goes to the owner of the property, not to Creditor
L (because L has not filed an intervention in the suit).
If a third party had been the successful bidder at this sale and
had bid $400,000, the third party would have paid the sheriff
$400,000,1'' from which the sheriff would distribute $300,000 to
Creditor M, $75,000 to Creditor 0, and $25,000 to the owner of
the property.
Whether the successful bidder is second mortgage Creditor M
or a third party, neither Creditor M nor Creditor 0 is entitled to
seek a deficiency judgment, because their secured debts have been
fully satisfied by the sale.
B. Foreclosure Sales Involving a Third Party Possessor
The distribution of sheriff sale proceeds must take into account
the rights of third party possessors who have filed an
intervention 152 in the proceedings. Third party possessors in
Louisiana are owners of property who are not personally liable to
the foreclosing creditor.' 53 In other words, third party possessors
148. As in other hypothetical examples, the costs of the sale are not included
in these calculations.
149. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2374. See also Casey v. Nat'l Info. Serv.,
Inc., 906 So. 2d 710, 716-17 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005).
150. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2373, 2376.
151. As noted supra note 125, these examples do not take into account the
costs of the sale, which would otherwise have to be included in the calculation
of the proceeds distributions.
152. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1092, 2643, 2703.
153. Code of Civil Procedure article 3343 provides that the definition of
"third party" is, among other things, a person "who is not a party to or
personally bound by an instrument." Id. art. 3343. The article goes on to note
that a "person who by contract assumes an obligation ... is not a third person
with respect to the obligation or right or to the instrument creating or
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are those who purchased property "subject to" a preexisting
mortgage. 1
54
Third party possessors are entitled to claim the lesser of (1) the
costs of improvements they have made to the property 155 or (2) the
value of the enhancements.' 56 The method of calculating the
distribution is a "waterfall" distribution-that is, if there is cash
available after paying the first level, it flows down to the second
level; if there is still cash left after paying off levels one and two, it
flows down to level three, and after that to level four. The levels are:
" First, cash from the sale equal to the unenhanced value of
the property goes to the foreclosing creditor.
" Second, the third party possessor gets an amount equal to
the lesser of (1) the costs of the enhancements or (2) the
increase in value of the collateral resulting from the
enhancement.
* Third, any remaining funds go to the foreclosing creditor
until paid.
* Fourth, any remaining funds go to inferior creditors (in the
order that their security interests rank) until they are paid in
full, with any sums remaining after that to the third party
possessor.
establishing it." Id. See also id. art. 2703, for the rights of Third Party Possessors
in an executory proceeding.
154. Code of Civil Procedure article 2703 refers to a Third Party Possessor as
a "person who has acquired the property subject to the mortgage or privilege
thereon and who has not assumed the payment of the indebtedness secured
thereby." Id. art. 2703. Third party possessor status can also result if a purchaser
buys property by a "cash sale" in which the seller has failed to mention or
disclose existing mortgages and encumbrances. In such an instance, the seller
has breached its warranty of title to the buyer. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2475 (2009).
But the mortgages remain extant on the property. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art.
2701. The buyer has no personal liability to the holders of the mortgages. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3315.
155. The improvements could also have been made by a predecessor in title
to the third party possessor provided that the predecessor in title also was a third
party possessor. This is because the sale transfers all benefits of the property to
the vendee, and a third party possessor can "assert any claim which he has to the
enhanced value of the property due to improvements placed on the property...
by any prior third possessor through whom he claims ownership of the
property." See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2703. In fact, a party need not be a
vendee to claim the benefits of the third party possessor. For example, a
mortgagee of a third party possessor may step into the mortgagor-third party
possessor's shoes to receive the benefits. See Citizens' Bank of La. v. Miller,
412 So. 516 (La. 1893).
156. Glass v. Ives, 126 So. 69,71 (La. 1930). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3318.
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This process can be illustrated by the following examples.
Under these examples, as in Examples I and J, Creditor L holds a
$100,000 first mortgage on the property, Creditor M holds a
$300,000 second mortgage on the same tract, and Creditor 0 holds
a $75,000 third mortgage on the same tract. 157 Creditor M is the
foreclosing creditor in a suit into which third mortgage Creditor 0
has intervened 58 but first mortgage Creditor L has not.
Unlike Examples I and J, however, Seller X, a homeowner,
was the debtor on the mortgages held by Creditors L and M on X's
home, but Seller X has sold the property to Buyer Y by a sale
subject to the mortgages held by Creditors L, M, and 0.
Example K: If the property appraises at Creditor M's foreclosure
sale for $525,000, Creditor M might think that it will ultimately
be entitled to full compensation from the proceeds of the sale of
the property, for it has a $300,000 second mortgage, Creditor L
has a $100,000 first mortgage. The minimum bid at the
foreclosure sale will be $350,000 (two-thirds of $525,000),
which is more than sufficient to pay off Creditor M's $300,000
mortgage. Creditor M, however, has failed to account for the
possibility that Buyer Y may assert her third party possessor
rights.
Comments on Example K: If Buyer Y wishes to invoke her third
party possessor ri .hts, then Buyer Y will need to both seek a
separate appraisal 9 and introduce proof of the costs of the
improvements made. Buyer Y needs a separate appraisal because
the only appraisal the foreclosing creditor requires for a deficiency
judgment relates to the value of the property at the time of
157. As in the previous hypotheticals, the assumption is that the face amount
of each mortgage equals the sum owing on each mortgage at the time of
foreclosure.
158. Creditor 0 need not intervene to be entitled to the rights discussed in
Examples I and J, because the Sheriff must distribute proceeds that exceed the
foreclosing creditor's mortgage to inferior secured creditors and then, if any
remains, to the owner of the property. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2373. In any
event, however, unlike first mortgage Creditor L who gets no notice of second
mortgage Creditor M's foreclosure proceedings because Creditor L's mortgage
is unaffected, third mortgage Creditor 0 must get notice of the foreclosure sale.
The notice to Creditor 0 is required under the procedural due process rules set
forth in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), which
requires notice to those whose property rights (including mortgages and security
interests) may be affected by a foreclosure sale. The due process issues relating
to foreclosures is beyond the scope of this paper, but the key cases include:
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774
(5th Cir. 1989); Small Engine Shop v. Cascio, 878 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1989);
Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987).
159. LA. CODE Civ. PROC. art. 1092. See also Glass, 126 So. 69.
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foreclosure, but the third party possessor is entitled to collect the
lesser of the cost of the improvements made or the enhancements to
value caused by the improvements; the only way an enhancement to
value can be shown is by having an appraisal of the property made
that excludes the improvements erected by the third party
possessor.] 60 Thus, Buyer Y will need to assert her third party
possessor rights and introduce an appraisal, in ample time prior to
the judicial sale, 161 to demonstrate the enhanced value. Likewise,
Buyer Y will need to be able to prove the cost of the improvements.
Assume Buyer Y demonstrates that the costs of the improvements
were $125,000, and Buyer Y's appraisal shows that, without the
enhancements, the property would be worth only $250,000.162 Now
the distribution of the proceeds would be as follows:
" First, the unenhanced value of the property ($250,000) to
foreclosing Creditor M. That leaves $100,000 of the
$350,000 minimum bid price to be distributed, 163 but this
money does not go Creditor M at this point.
• Second, the third party possessor gets any excess, but only
equal to the lesser of costs or enhancements. In this case the
costs were $125,000 and the enhancement was $275,000
($525,000 appraised value with enhancements minus
$250,000 appraised value without enhancements). Buyer Y,
as a third party possessor, is entitled to claim only the lesser
of the costs or the enhancement; the lesser number is
160. See Glass, 126 So. 69.
161. Code of Civil Procedure article 1092 states that a third person claiming
"ownership or, or a mortgage or privilege on, property seized" may intervene.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1092. If ownership is claimed, the intervention must
be filed at any time prior to the judicial sale, and the court is allowed to enjoin
the sale until the third person's ownership claims are resolved. If the third
person claims a mortgage or privilege, it may intervene at any time prior to the
sheriff's distribution of proceeds of the sale of the property.
162. This example is not farfetched. The test of "enhancements" is made by
comparing at the time offoreclosure the value of the property with and without
the enhancements. The court in Glass, 126 So. at 70, considered what the value
of the property was at the time of the suit: "The evidence shows that the
property is worth now only about $6,000. . . ." On the other hand, the test of the
cost of enhancement looks to the actual out-of-pocket costs of the third party
possessor, regardless of when these costs were incurred. Thus, it is possible that
although the property is worth $525,000 today, at the time the enhancements
were made fifteen years ago, the cost to make these enhancements was only
$125,000. Today, it might cost two or three times that amount to make those
same enhancements, but the test of "costs" for third party possessors does not
look to the present value of these sums or worth of the costs as measured by
inflation (or deflation) but rather to the actual out-of-pocket costs.
163. The minimum bid was $350,000; 350,000 - 250,000 = 100,000.
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$125,000, but there is only $100,000 of the bid price to be
distributed, so Buyer Y gets the entire $100,000.
* Third, any excess to the foreclosing creditor until paid.
There is no excess from the bid price. Therefore, Creditor
M gets nothing and Creditor 0 gets nothing.
" Fourth, any excess to inferior creditors (in the order of their
security interests) until they are paid in full and then to the
third party possess. There is no excess here either.
Note in this example that if Buyer Y had not claimed third
party possessor rights, foreclosing Creditor M would have received
the entire $300,000 from the $350,000 minimum bid, and third
mortgage Creditor 0 would have received the remaining $50,000
of funds. When Buyer Y intervenes to claim third party possessor
status, however, the distributions change. Foreclosing Creditor M
gets only $250,000, third mortgage Creditor 0 gets nothing, and
both Creditor M and Creditor 0 are left to pursue Buyer Y for the
remaining deficiencies. Neither Creditor M nor Creditor 0 have a
security interest in the $100,000 Buyer Y received from the sale as
third party possessor, because the only rights that Creditors M and
O had were as secured creditors of Seller X and Seller X's
property; they had no personal claim against Buyer Y.
In Example K, Creditor L's first mortgage is unaffected by the
foreclosure sale because it has not intervened into the proceedings;
therefore, it can begin its own foreclosure suit the very next day if
the Seller Y is in default on the mortgage to Creditor L.
C. Foreclosure Sales Involving a Third Party Possessor Who Has
Granted a Mortgage to a Creditor
The rights of third party possessors can be affected by those
mortgage creditors as to which the third party has personal
liability. To put this another way, an owner may be a third party to
the foreclosing creditor but may not be a third party to other
mortgage creditors. Example L illustrates this situation.
As in Example K, Creditor L holds a $100,000 first mortgage
on property, Creditor M holds a $300,000 second mortgage on the
same tract and is the foreclosing creditor, both of which have been
granted by Seller X.
Unlike Example K, Creditor 0 is not the holder of a third
mortgage granted by Seller X. There is no Creditor 0 in Example L.
As in Example K, Seller X has sold the property to Buyer Y
subject to L and M's mortgage. After the sale, however, Buyer Y
borrows $190,000 from Creditor 02 and grants Creditor 02 a
mortgage on the property to secure the loan. Buyer Y now uses the
$190,000 to construct a home on the property.
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Example L: At the time of foreclosure, the property appraises for
$525,000, Buyer Y intervenes to claim third party possessor
status, and Buyer Y demonstrates that while the costs of the
enhancements were $190,000, the value of the property without
the enhancements was $250,000 (as in Example K).
Comments on Example L: The minimum bid at this sale would be
$350,000 (two-thirds of $525,000), which is greater than Creditor L's
first mortgage (and Creditor L has not intervened into the sale). Under
this example, the distribution of the sales proceeds would be as
follows:
" First, the unenhanced value of the property ($250,000) to
foreclosing Creditor M. That leaves $100,000 of the bid
price to be distributed. 
164
" Second, any excess to the lesser of costs or enhancements
to the third party possessor. In this case the costs were
$190,000 and the enhancement was $275,000 ($525,000
appraisal value with enhancements minus $250,000
appraisal value without enhancements). Buyer Y, as a third
party possessor, is entitled to claim only the lesser of the
costs or the enhancement; the lesser number is $190,000,
but there is only $100,000 of the $350,000 minimum bid
price to be distributed, so Buyer Y gets the entire $100,000.
• Unlike Example, K, however, while Buyer Y is a third
party possessor to foreclosing Creditor M, Buyer Y is
personally liable on the mortgage to third mortgage
Creditor 02, so Buyer Y by definition is not a third party
possessor as to Creditor 02 (because if an owner is
personally liable to the mortgage creditor, the owner cannot
be a third party possessor1 65). An attribute of Creditor 02's
mortgage (which secures Buyer Y's personal obligations to
Creditor 02) is that Creditor 02 can "step into the shoes"
of Buyer Y and claim Buyer Y's third party possessor
status as against foreclosing Creditor M and thus take the
money that otherwise would have gone to Buyer Y at this
point.' 66 Therefore, the $100,000 goes to Creditor 02. At
164. The minimum bid was $350,000; 350,000 - 250,000 = 100,000.
165. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 3343 (2009).
166. This was the express holding of Citizens' Bank of Louisiana. v. Miller,
12 So. 516, 517 (1893), where the court stated:
Therefore the Excelsior Planting & Manufacturing Company was held to
be a third possessor, entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Article
3407 of the Civil Code. But, as between the Excelsior Planting &
Manufacturing Company and J. K. Ober et al., the former was not a third
possessor. As to them the company or corporation was the original
mortgage debtor, and, as such, owed Ober et al. the amount due for the
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this point, Creditor M is still owed $50,000167 and Creditor
02 is owed $90,000168
* Third, any excess to the foreclosing creditor until paid. There
is no excess, so Creditors M and 02 get nothing further.
* Fourth, any excess to inferior creditors (in the order of their
security interests) until they are paid in full and then to the
third party possessor. There is no excess here.
Note that in this Example L, third mortgage Creditor 02 gets
$100,000 by asserting the third party possessor right of its
mortgagor. Creditor 02 could arguably have done this on its own
even if Buyer Y had not intervened. Had third party possessor
status not been claimed at all, however, foreclosing Creditor M
would have received the payoff of its mortgage ($300,000) from
the minimum bid of $350,000, and Creditor 02 would have
received only the remaining $50,000. Thus, when Creditor 02
asserts Buyer Y's third party possessor status, Creditor 02 gets
more money and Creditor M gets less.
Of course, as in Example K, Creditor L's mortgage is
unaffected by the foreclosure sale.
IX. ISSUES INVOLVING A SECOND JUDICIAL SALE
Prior to 1995, there apparently were some creditors who made a
habit of filing executory process suits with appraisal but who did not
bid at all in the first sale. If there were no other bids, the property
enhanced value of the plantation on account of the improvements. There
is no argument necessary to show that the mortgagee cannot have his
debt diminished on account of improvements placed on the mortgaged
property. Whatever improvements are placed thereon necessarily fall
under the operation of the mortgage, and the mortgage creditor is entitled
to the benefit of the enhanced value of the property and this enhanced
value can in no way be separated from the mortgaged property between
mortgagor and mortgagee, so as to become what counsel for Sells & Co.
denominated an "incorporeal right," and therefore incapable of being
subjected to the mortgage of Ober et al. The plantation, with its
prospective value, from whatever source, was subject to the mortgage of
J. K. Ober et al. The proceeds of the sale represent the property in its
entirety, and there is no means of separating the enhanced value from it.
167. Creditor M has already collected $250,000 of its $300,000 mortgage.
168. Creditor 02 has just collected $100,000 of its $190,000 mortgage.
169. While the Citizens' Bank case does not directly stand for this
proposition, it is clear from the holding that a mortgagor, who is a third party
possessor, necessarily encumbers all of their rights as third party possessors on
the collateral property. In the event of default, the mortgagee is entitled to the
benefits that inure to the encumbered property, which necessarily includes the
rights of third party possessors.
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could not be sold at the first sale and a second sale under the Code
of Civil Procedure was required. At the second sale, there was no
requirement that the minimum bid be two-thirds of the appraised
value (as there was at the first sale), although the minimum bid had
to exceed superior mortgages or encumbrances.
70
This led to a situation where, prior to 1995, creditors who did
not bid at the first sale (when there was no other adverse bids) and
who routinely allowed the property to be sold at the second sale
could receive a huge windfall when there were no superior
mortgages. This is because the minimum bid at the second sale was
merely costs. In that event, there would be nothing to attribute to
the mortgagor's debt. The creditor would receive the property (for
merely costs) by being the successful bidder at the second sale, and
the creditor would be entitled to pursue the debtor for the entire
amount of the debt as a deficiency.
To prevent creditors, as a matter of course, from foreclosing on
property, refusing to bid at the first sale, and then buying property
at a second sale for costs, thereby obtaining a vast windfall that the
Deficiency Judgment Act was designed to prevent, the Code of
Civil Procedure was amended in 1995. 17 Rather than setting a new
two-thirds rule for the amount of the bid at the second sale, the
amendment created a requirement that the creditor reduce the debt
by "the greater of either one-half of the appraised value, less
superior security interests, mortgages, liens, and privileges, or the
amount by which the price bid exceeds superior security interests,
mortgages, liens, and privileges."' 72 This rule combines the
procedural approach of the Deficiency Judgment Act (mandating
that the debt be reduced by a certain amount, regardless of the bid
price) with a substantive recognition that the minimum bid at the
second sale might in fact approach or exceed the fair market value
of the property. This can be illustrated by the following examples.
In these examples, Creditor Q is owed $100,000.00 and is
secured by a $100,000 first mortgage on the property, but Creditor
Q does not intervene in the executory proceedings brought by
Creditor R, which is owed $300,000 and is secured by a $300,000
second mortgage.
Example M 173 The property appraises for $600,000, but no one
bids the minimum two-thirds ($400,000) of appraised value at
170. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2337 (2009).
171. 1995 La. Acts No. 1023.
172. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2336.




the first sale. 174 At the second sale, the minimum bid is
$100,000.00, the amount of Creditor Q's first mortgage
claim. 17
5
Comments on Example M. If Creditor R purchases the property
for the $100,000.00 bid price, it pays nothing to the sheriff' '7
because the bid price is less than its $300,000 mortgage. Because
the bid equaled the amount owed to first mortgage Creditor Q,
Creditor R must reduce the debtor's obligation by $200,000, which
is "one-half of the appraised value"'17 7 ($600,000 + 2 = $300,000)
minus "superior security interests, mortgages, liens, and
privileges"'1 8 ($100,000). Therefore, after the second sale at which
foreclosing Creditor R bids $100,000 on a $600,000 tract of land
securing a $300,000 debt, the debt is reduced by $200,000.
Therefore, Creditor R, who now has property worth $600,000 for
which it has paid only costs, can pursue the debtor for a $100,000
deficiency.'17  The property is still secured by Creditor Q's
$100,000 first mortage, but foreclosing Creditor R has achieved a
potential windfall.'
Of course, Creditor Q's mortgage remains unaffected by the
judicial sale.
Example N: The facts are the same as in Example M, but this time
the property appraises for $300,000. Now the minimum bid is
174. The minimum bid is two-thirds of $600,000, the appraised value of the
property. LA. CODE ClV. PROC. art. 2336. Since $400,000 (two-thirds of
$600,000) exceeds Creditor Q's $100,000 mortgage, the minimum bid is
$400,000. Id. arts. 2336, 2337.
175. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2337, stating that if "the price offered by the
highest bidder at the ... subsequent offering is not sufficient to discharge the
costs of the sale and the security interests, mortgages, liens, and privileges
superior to that of the seizing creditor, the property shall not be sold."
176. As in the other examples, costs of the sale are not taken into account for
ease of understanding. In actuality, however, Creditor R would have to pay the
costs of suit and the sheriff's commissions. Id. art. 2373.
177. Id. art. 2336.
178. Id.
179. $600,000/2 = $300,000 - $100,000 bid (which does not exceed the
amount of Creditor Q's superior mortgage) = $200,000.
180. The windfall is that the net value of the property is $500,000 ($600,000
appraised value minus Creditor Q's $100,000 first mortgage) plus the ability to
sue the debtor for a $100,000 deficiency. This windfall in fact is greater than if
foreclosing Creditor R had bid two-thids at the first sale. This is because if
Creditor R had bid two-thirds at the first sale, that amount ($400,000) would
have been greater than the debt owed to Creditor R. There would be no
deficiency judgment at all, in contrast to the second sale situation where
Creditor R both acquires the property (which has $500,000 in equity) and can
pursue the debtor for a $100,000 deficiency.
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$200,000 (two-thirds of the appraised value, and this two-thirds
number is greater than Creditor Q's first mortgage). There are
no bids at the first sale and a second sale is held. At the second
sale other bidders show up and actually make bids. Now, rather
than purchase the property for the $100,000 minimum bid (as
in Example M), foreclosing Creditor R gets the property, but
only by bidding $275,000.
Comments to Example N: In this case Creditor R must reduce
the debt owed by "the greater of either one-half of the appraised
value, less superior security interests, mortgages, liens, and
privileges, or the amount by which the price bid exceeds superior
security interests, mortgages, liens, and privileges. ' 81 Since one-
half of the appraised value is $150,000, and since $175,000 is the
amount that the bid exceeds first mortgage Creditor Q's superior
$100,000 mortgage, the deficiency that Creditor R can seek is
limited to $125,000. ($300,000 - $175,000). Again, however,
Creditor R, by being the successful bidder, receives a windfall by
owning property that has equity and is still able to sue the debtor
for a deficiency.'
8 2
As in Example M, Creditor Q's mortgage remains unaffected
by the judicial sale.
Additional Comments on Examples M and N: Examples M and
N demonstrate that even at the second sale, it is possible that a
foreclosing creditor who is the successful bidder might receive a
windfall by (1) being able to collect a deficiency judgment and (2)
receiving more than what was owed by the debtor when the
property is later sold by the creditor at an amount equal to or in
excess of the appraised value given prior to the first sheriffs sale
(at which the property was not sold). The windfall results from the
assumption that the property can later be sold for at least its
appraised value and that the deficiency in fact can be collected.
The fact that it is theoretically possible for the foreclosing
creditor to receive a windfall, however, does not mean that the
Deficiency Judgment Act and the Code of Civil Procedure do not
perform useful functions. Even assuming that the appraised value
of the property is entirely accurate and truly reflects the fair market
181. LA. CODE CiV. PROC. art. 2336.
182. The windfall here is the $200,000 net value of the property ($300,000
appraised value minus $100,000 first mortgage) plus the ability to sue the debtor
for a $125,000 deficiency. Thus, although foreclosing Creditor R is owed only
$300,000, it will be able to collect $325,000, assuming the property can be sold
for at least its appraised value and the deficiency can be collected.
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value of the property,' 8 3 the mere fact that a creditor has foreclosed
usually means that the property will bring less when the creditor
tries to market it, for it is likely that the public will believe that the
creditor must dispose of the property quickly at "firesale" prices.
84
Thus, it may be unlikely that the creditor will realize the appraised
value of the property. Further, because a deficiency seeks a
personal judgment against the debtor, if the deficiency is
uncollectible, either because the debtor simply does not have
enough assets to satisfy the deficiency or because the debtor files
for bankruptcy, the creditor's action in invoking the second sale
may not result in any actual windfall.
The theoretical fact that a creditor may be able to collect more
than the debt (if the creditor is the successful bidder at a first or
second sale, is able to realize the full appraised value of the
property, and is able to collect the deficiency) merely emphasizes
the practical fact that judicial sales may not result in a sale at a
price equal to the fair market value of the property. Indeed, the
entire function of the Deficiency Judgment Act in creating
procedural hurdles requiring a reduction of the debt 185 may
undermine the assumption set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court that
foreclosure sales should be presumed to bring fair market value
183. Of course, if the appraisal reflected the fair market value of the property,
then the fact that a second sale occurs because of the lack of a two-thirds
appraised value bid at the first sale only underscores the inadequacy of
foreclosures to result in judicial sales that realize fair market value.
184. See, e.g., J.W. Elphinstone, Foreclosure Fire Sale, Aug. 29, 2007, WASH.
POST, http://washingtontimes.com/article/20070829/BUSINESS/108290014/1006
(last visited December 1, 2008). See also Bernard Condon, Fire Sale, FORBES,
Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.forbes. com/forbes/2008/0407/040.html ("Last summer
Wells Fargo was in a bind: A Rochester Hills, Mich. couple had taken out a
$465,000 mortgage they couldn't pay back without selling their home. But no one
was willing to pay such a high price. So the bank tried to recoup the debt in a
foreclosure sale. Still no takers. In February, after watching prices in this Detroit
suburb crater, the bank threw up its hands, selling the four-bedroom brick colonial
for $325,000.").
Many creditors are not in the business of marketing property and have
internal as well as regulatory needs to "get the property off their books" as fast
as possible. To use as just one illustration, national banks are bound by Federal
Regulations regarding property taken back or obtained via foreclosure. In an
effort to increase capital, allowing the bank to transact business in compliance
with regulations, the bank will write the loan value down to zero upon default.
These same regulations specify that such national banks may only hold such
property for a finite period of time. For more information, see 12 C.F.R. § 34.81
(2009) and following.
185. As outlined in Code of Civil Procedure art. 2336, the procedural hurdle
at the first sale is the two-thirds appraised value requirement, and the procedural
hurdle at the second sale is compliance with the debt reduction rules.
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and the actual foreclosure sale amount should set the basis of the
deficiency available.' 
86
X. STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM THE LouISIANA DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT ACT
The Deficiency Judgment Act reflects a strong public policy
that cannot be voluntarily waived even by knowledgeable and
sophisticated parties. 8 7 Since the Act came into existence in the
1930s, however, statutory exemptions have been created.
These statutory exemptions from the prohibition against
deficiency judgments (in the absence of a judicial sale with
appraisal) can be grouped into five categories: (1) matters in which
an appraisal is not required because the property is cash or cash
equivalents;18 8 (2) matters in which an appraisal is not required
because the markets are fluid and transparent;89 (3) actions taking
place under federal bankruptcy law or the law of other states; 9 0 (4)
matters where the parties voluntarily agree, after default, to the
value of the collateral and the amount of the deficiency; 191 and (5)
186. In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), the issue was
whether under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006), a property's fair
market value should be used to ascertain whether the amount paid at a
foreclosure sale equals the "reasonably equivalent value" of the property. In a
five to four ruling, the Court held that the value paid at the foreclosure sale was
determinative in the bankruptcy context, even if it might have brought less than
the fair market value. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545. The Court stated:
For the reasons described, we decline to read the phrase "reasonably
equivalent value" in § 548(a)(2) to mean, in its application to mortgage
foreclosure sales, either "fair market value" or "fair foreclosure price"
(whether calculated as a percentage of fair market value or otherwise).
We deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and proper price,
or a "reasonably equivalent value," for foreclosed property, is the price
in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements
of the State'sforeclosure law have been complied with.
Id. (emphasis added). There are many articles about BFP, including: Eric S.
Palace, In re BFP: Just a Band-Aid?-Looking for a Stable Solution that
Balances Creditors' and Debtors' Rights Under Bankruptcy Code Section
548(A)(2), 15 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 359 (1996); Marie T. Reilly, A Search for
Reason in Reasonably Equivalent Value after BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 261 (2005); Jessica L. Wasserstrom, The Judicial
Search for Objectivity in Valuation, Third Circuit Rules That Market
Capitalization Is Preferred Method of Valuing Assets in the Fraudulent Transfer
Context, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 58 (2007).
187. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4107 (2006).
188. Id. § 13:4108(5).
189. Id. § 13:4108(1), (2).
190. Id. § 13:4108(3), (4).
191. Id. §§ 13:4108.1, 13:4108.2.
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transactions falling within the scope of Louisiana's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code.'
92
This Section examines the first four categories; the next section
reviews U.C.C. issues.
A. Cash and Cash Equivalents
When the asset consists of cash or the equivalent of cash, the
legislature allows creditors to pursue a deficiency without
proceeding by a judicial sale with appraisal. 193 This is entirely
understandable, for there is no need to appraise the value of cash or
cash equivalents, and the debtor will clearly receive the full credit
for the collateral when it is sold if the collateral consists of cash or
cash equivalents. Therefore, a creditor's offset of a certificate of
deposit,' 94 the creditor's receipt of a refund of insurance
premiums, 95 or the creditor's collection of accounts receivable
will not bar a deficiency.' 96
B. Transparent and Fluid Markets
The second statutory exception to the Deficiency Judgment Act
concerns national markets that are broad, transparent, and fluid.
There can be little question that the value received for collateral
disposed of on those national markets will be the fair market value
of the property at the exact time the collateral is sold on those
markets. There is no need for an appraisal if property is continually
valued, readily accessible, and easily tradable on a broad-based
market. Thus, sales of stock and commodities on national
exchanges are statutorily exempt from the Deficiency Judgment
Act,' 97 but the statutory exemptions from the Deficiency Judgment
Act do not include any market other than the NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ, and the Chicago Commodity Exchange.198
192. Id. § 13:4108.3.
193. Id. § 13:4108.
194. Id. § 13:4108(5)(b).
195. Id. § 13:4108(6). This statute overrules the holding of Rushing v.
Dairyland Ins. Co., 456 So. 2d 599 (La. 1984).
196. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108(5)(c).
197. Id. § 13:4108(1), (2) (regarding the sale of stocks, bonds, or options
through the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the
NASDAQ, and the sale of options on the Chicago Commodity Exchange).
198. Id. § 13:4108, providing in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, including but not
limited to La. R.S. 13:4106 and 4107, none of the following actions by
a mortgagee or other creditor shall prohibit the mortgagee or other
creditor from obtaining a deficiency judgment against any debtor,
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At the time this statutory exemption was created, 199 the vast
and fluid Internet marketing phenomena had not occurred. One
might anticipate that, at some point in the future, the legislature
may consider adding publicly recognized, broadly used, markets,
including Internet-based markets (such as eBay2 ° ) to the list of
statutory exemptions.2 °'
C. Actions Taking Place Under Federal Bankruptcy Law or the
Laws of Other States
The third group of statutory exemptions from the Deficiency
Judgment Act concerns creditors who proceed in bankruptcy court,
because the Bankruptcy Code has erected its own set of protections
for debtors and has a detailed system of judicial oversight.20 2
In addition, if a creditor has proceeded to foreclose on
collateral located in another state and uses that state's
procedures;203 it is impossible for the creditor to comply with the
guarantor, or surety, notwithstanding the fact that a sale of property or
collateral may have occurred at a judicial sale without appraisal, at a
public or private sale with or without appraisal, or at a judicial sale with
a defective appraisal: (1) A sale through the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the NASDAQ, of any
pledged stock, bonds, or options registered or traded on such
exchanges. (2) A sale through the Chicago Commodity Exchange of
any pledged options registered or traded on such exchange.
199. Revised Statutes section 13:4108 was enacted by 1986 La. Acts No. 489.
200. eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). The authors are
not suggesting that eBay is the only Internet market available or that it should be
used; rather, the purpose of the observation is to note that it is possible national,
fluid markets exist outside of the formalized structure of the national stock and
commodity exchanges.
201. The number of eBay traders is huge. As of 2005, there are over 212 million
eBay buyers and sellers, of which 128 million are in the USA, and more than
724,000 Americans report that eBay is their primary or secondary source of income,
while another 1.5 million individuals report supplementing their income by selling
on eBay. Updated eBay Statistics, Thebidfloor.com, http://www.thebidfloor.com/
ebaystatistics.htm#currentnumber of members (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
202. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108(3) (regarding the sale of collateral made
pursuant to an order of a U.S. Bankruptcy Court or a U.S. District Court sitting
in bankruptcy).
203. Revised Statutes section 13:4108(4) addresses collateral located outside
of Louisiana where the creditor elects to use the foreign jurisdiction's
procedures. Id. § 13:4108(4). This provision is a statutory recognition of thejudicial rule originally announced in Exchange National Bank of Chicago v.
Spalitta, 321 So. 2d 338, 343 (La. 1975), a case decided before section 13:4108
was enacted, holding that application of Louisiana's Deficiency Judgment Act
was inapplicable in the context of sales in bankruptcy.
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Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act if the state does not have a
mechanism to hold a judicial sale or for judicial sales with
appraisal. The Deficiency Judgment Act does not penalize a
creditor for utilizing a procedure that is valid in the state where the
asset is located.20 4
D. Work-Out Agreements
Creditors and debtors have an economic incentive to avoid
judicial foreclosures if they can reach a voluntary agreement to sell
the collateral and set the amount of the deficiency. Creditors may
prefer to avoid the delays inherent in judicial foreclosures, 20 5 while
debtors may prefer not being burdened with the extra costs of
judicial proceedings, which include court costs sheriffs
commissions, and legal fees for the creditor's counsel.20 6
The Louisiana Legislature has enacted two separate provisions
permitting creditors and debtors to reach voluntary agreements
concerning disposition of collateral and the collection of deficiency
judgments. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4108.1 controls
commercial transactions and section 13:4108.2 controls consumer
transactions, but both follow the same general principles.
Under Revised Statutes section 13:4108.1, the debtor and
creditor must reach an agreement concerning the value of the
collateral. The agreement can be reached only after the debt comes
due or after the debtor is in default on the obligation, for Louisiana
law prohibits a debtor from agreeing at the inception of a loan to
transfer ownership of the collateral to the creditor if there is a
default in the loan. 207 The statute uses "reasonably equivalent
204. In this regard, the effect of Revised Statutes section 13:4108(4) is
identical to the bankruptcy rule of BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531
(1994): a non-Louisiana state procedure for foreclosure is deemed to bring a fair
market value. See supra note 186.
205. Even with executory process, a judicial sale of immovable property
cannot be set less than thirty days from the date of the judgment because of the
statutory rules controlling advertisements for the sale, and it is not unusual for it
take up to sixty days from the date of the filing of the executory suit and thejudicial sale. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4341, 43:203.
206. It is not unusual for notes secured by mortgages to call for 25%
attorney's fees. While courts maintain the ability to supervise, control and set
the amount of such fees, fees can add a substantial amount to the debtor's
obligations. See Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers, 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982). For
example, in Metro Reporters, Inc. v. Avery, 665 So. 2d 547 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1995), a court reporting agency sued an attorney on an open account; the trial
court awarded attorney's fees that were equal to 69% of the amount of thejudgment awarded to the court reporters.
207. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Alcolea v. Smith, 90 So. 769
(La. 1922):
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value" to mean the agreed value of the collateral; 20 8 this phrase
echoes the identical words used in the Bankruptcy Code.20 9
The agreement should be reached after default but prior to the
disposition of the collateral, and preferably should be
memorialized in writing.210 In practice, the parties usually enter
Since the edict of Constantine annulling and prohibiting what was
known as the lex commissoria and the stipulation in the contract of
pledge which it authorized, whereby, in default of payment by the
pledgor, the thing pledged became the property of the pledgee without
further action on his part, such stipulations have been prohibited in all
countries where the civil law prevails, and the prohibition has long
since become part of the common law, the commentators on both
systems agreeing that they are contra bonos mores and oppressive; that
they involve the abuse of the power of the strong over the weak,
represent odious speculations by those who have money, at the expense
of those who need it, and are unconscionable.
208. Revised Statutes sections 13:4108.1(B)(2) and 13:4108.2(B)(2) are
similar. Under section 13:4108.1 (B)(2), "'Reasonably equivalent value' means the
value that the owner and the mortgagee or other creditor of the property being sold
or otherwise disposed of agree to attribute to the property for the purposes of
reducing the secured debt." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108.1(B)(2). Under
section 13:4108.2(B)(2), "'Reasonably equivalent value' means the value which
the owner and the mortgagee or other creditor expressly agree to attribute to the
property transferred as provided in Subsection A of this Section [which addresses
reduction of the debtor's outstanding obligation]." Id. § 13:4108.2(B)(2).
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2006), which uses the term "reasonably
equivalent value" in the context of fraudulent transfers. As noted in In re Miller:
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., the United States Supreme Court
discussed the meaning of "reasonably equivalent value" as used in 11
U.S.C. § 548. The Court held that the price paid by a third-party
purchaser at a foreclosure sale for real property was the reasonably
equivalent value for that property as long as all applicable state laws were
complied with. In TF. Stone Co. v. Harper, the Fifth Circuit extended
the reasoning in BFP to § 549(c). Thus, it applied the Supreme Court's
holding from a case involving a pre-bankruptcy petition mortgage
foreclosure sale to a post-petition tax foreclosure sale.
454 F.3d 899, 901-02 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
210. The exception provided under Revised Statutes section 13:4108.1 was
discussed in Echo, Inc. v. Power Equipment Distributors, Inc., 719 So. 2d 79
(La. App. 1 st Cir. 1998). In Echo, a wholesaler sought a deficiency judgment on
amounts owed under a terminated distributorship agreement after recouping
unsold inventory and reselling the same to other distributors via a private sale.
Id. at 83. The distributorship agreement contained merchandise buy-back
provisions in the event of default. Id. Additionally, the wholesaler sent a letter to
the distributor upon termination outlining buy-back prices for inventory that the
wholesaler would credit to the distributor. Id. The distributor even assisted the
wholesaler in loading the inventory on a truck for return to the wholesaler. Id.
Despite this, the Court found that there was no evidence of the surrender of
inventory being a partial dation en paiement; that the distributorship agreement
was not part of a work-out agreement; and that there was no evidence of a
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into a written contract setting value of the property, defining the
debt, and describing that after the disposition of the collateral the
debtor will be liable for a deficiency equal to the difference
between (1) the debt, and (2) the greater of the agreed value of the
property or the price the collateral brings at its disposition.
If the agreement is reached, then the creditor will be entitled to
a deficiency, regardless of whether the disposition of the collateral
is a public, private, or judicial sale. Further, under such an
agreement, the parties can agree that the creditor may become the
owner of the collateral.2 1'
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4108.2, concerning
consumer transactions,212 provides additional protections for
debtors. The agreement must inform the debtor, "in laymen's
voluntary agreement between the parties regarding the reasonable value that
should be attributed to the assets, despite the distributor's acquiescence to the
surrender of inventory, so as to enable the creditor to use an exception to the
deficiency judgment prohibition. Id. at 95.
Other courts have similarly held that the exceptions outlined under section
13:4108.1 were inapplicable where there was no evidence that the parties
attempted to enter into a work-out or settled on a reasonably equivalent value to
apply to the debt. See Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kinchen, 622 So. 2d 662,
665 (La. 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Houma v. Bailey, 583 So. 2d 559 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1991).
211. Sections 13:4108.1 and 13:4108.2 use different terminology to
accomplish this purpose.
Section 13:4108.1 states that the exception to the Deficiency Judgment Act
applies:
[W]hether or not the mortgagee or other creditor has foreclosed on all
or any of the property and sold such property at a judicial, public, or
private sale, with or without appraisal, regardless of the minimum bid,
and whether or not the mortgagee or other creditor has acquired such
property from any debtor, guarantor, or surety pursuant to a complete
or partial giving in payment.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108.1 (emphasis added). The reference to a
"complete or partial giving in payment" is legislatively designed to obviate any
claim that a dation en paiement, a giving in payment (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2655),
must extinguish a debt completely. Thus, sections 13:4108.1 and 13:4108.2
explicitly allow a creditor to become owner of the collateral and still collect a
deficiency as long as the other requirements of these acts are met.
Section 13:4108.2 notes that a deficiency may be obtained if the requirements of
this section are met, even "if the mortgagee or other creditor has acquired such
property from the debtor. .. ." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108.2 (emphasis added).
212. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108.2, defining a "consumer transaction" as
"any transaction entered into for personal, family, or household (noncommercial)
purposes and particularly includes transactions that are secured by residential
immovable property, but excluding secured transactions for consumer purposes
that are subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws."
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terms," 213 of the right to obtain an appraisal. Under the agreement,
the creditor must attribute at least 75% of the appraised value to
the debt and the debtor must agree to remain liable for the
deficiency. The agreement must inform the debtor that she is
forfeiting the right to "judicial appraisal and sale." Of course, had
there been a "judicial appraisal and sale," the debtor would have a
214
right to appoint an appraiser, but the minimum bid at the
sheriffs sale would be only two-thirds of the appraised value, not
three-quarters as under Revised Statutes section 13:4108.2, and the
judicial sale costs and attorneys fees incurred in a law suit would
be added.
Both sections 13:4108.1 and 4108.2 provide creditors and
debtors with a mechanism to avoid the time and expense of judicial
proceedings while at the same time permitting the parties to define
the value of the property and the amount of the deficiency. If the
debtor does not agree, the debtor can compel the creditor to invoke
a judicial sale.
In no event, however, can the creditor repossess the property
without the debtor's consent.215
XI. THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT DOES NOT EXTINGUISH THE
DEBT
If a creditor violates the Deficiency Judgment Act, the creditor
can no longer pursue the debtor for any additional payments, even
if the price brought at the sale does not equal the amount of the
debt. This does not mean, however, that the entirety of the
obligation is extinguished.
The Deficiency Judgment Act states that, if it is violated, "the
debt nevertheless shall stand fully satisfied and discharged insofar as
it constitutes a personal obligation of the debtor."216 This lan uage
is deliberate and limited. The debt itself is not extinguished2 ' as is
made clear by the next section of the Act, which allows a creditor
who has violated the Deficiency Judgment Act to sell other
213. Id. § 13:4108.2(D).
214. Id. § 13:4363.
215. See discussion of Louisiana's prohibition against self-help, supra notes
19 and 28.
216. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106(A) (emphasis added).
217. Some courts have stated in dicta that a violation of the Act results in an
extinction of the debt, but this dicta cannot be squared with the express language
of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4106(B). For a case with this dicta, see
Farmerville Bank v. Scheen, 76 So. 2d 581, 584-85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955)
("By virtue of such procedure under said statute, Holmes, the principal debtor,
was released and discharged and, in fact, the debt itself discharged.").
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collateral on which it has a security interest.218 If the debt itself had
been extinguished, the accessory obligation constituting the security
interest would have become unenforceable.
219
Therefore, if a mortgage affects two tracts in two different
parishes and if a creditor forecloses on the first tract without
appraisal, the creditor cannot pursue the debtor for the deficiency
but can foreclose on the second tract and obtain a privilege on the
proceeds of the sale220 up to the value of the remaining deficiency.
Of course, if the sale of the second tract does not satisfy the
deficiency, the creditor cannot pursue the debtor for any additional
monies.
XII. SURETIES, GUARANTORS, AND THE LOUISIANA DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT ACT
22 1
The text of the key provision of the Deficiency Judgment Act,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4016, refers to the "debtor,"
not to any sureties. On the other hand, in a voluntary work-out
situation under section 13:4108.1 (the section dealing with
commercial and not consumer debt), a surety cannot claim
218. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106(B) ("If a mortgage or pledge affects two or
more properties, movable, immovable, or both, the judicial sale of any property so
affected without appraisement shall not prevent the enforcement of the mortgage or
pledge in rem against any other property affected thereby."). See Bankers Trust of
La. v. Smith, 629 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) (allowing an in rem judgment
against property via Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4106(B)).
219. Louisiana Civil Code article 1913 defines "accessory contract" as one
made to provide security for the performance of an obligation. The obligation
being secured is the principal obligation. For suretyship, extinction of the
principal obligation extinguishes the suretyship. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3059 (2009).
On the other hand, while a Louisiana mortgage is accessory to a principal
obligation, the Civil Code permits parties to create a mortgage which secures a
non-recourse obligation. See id. arts. 3282, 3297.
220. Louisiana Civil Code article 3279 expressly grants the mortgagee "upon
failure of the obligor to perform the obligation that the mortgage secures, the
right to cause the property to be seized and sold.., and to have the proceeds
applied toward the satisfaction of the obligation in preference to claims of
others." LA. CIv. CODE art. 3279.
221. For the Louisiana Civil Code articles on suretyship, see LA. C[V. CODE
art. 3035-3070. Louisiana jurisprudence uses the terms "surety" and guarantor"
interchangeably. See, e.g., Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Dev. Co., 371 So.
2d 755 (La. 1979); Fleet Fuel, Inc. v. Mynex, Inc., 924 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 930 So. 2d 977 (La. 2006).
The form of suretyship contract routinely used by creditors is often entitled a
"Continuing Guarantee." See, e.g., First Bank & Trust v. N & S Specialties, Inc.,
947 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2007); City of Minden v. Ray, 914 So. 2d
1195 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005); Kinkle v. R.D.C., L.L.C, 889 So. 2d 405 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 2004).
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protection under the Deficiency Judgment Act if the debtor and
creditor otherwise comply with this statute. 222 While identical
language is not used in Revised Statutes section 13:4108.2 (the
consumer debt provision), it appears that the result should be the
same-if the creditor can collect from a consumer debtor as an
exception to the Deficiency Judgment Act, there is no reason why
the surety should be able to use the Deficiency Judgment Act when
the debtor cannot.
223
A more difficult question, however, is what happens to a surety
if the creditor's violation of the Deficiency Judgment Act bars a
claim against the debtor. In the almost twenty decisions 224 that
discuss (either directly or tangentially) a surety's liability under the
Deficiency Judgment Act since the Act was created almost eight
decades ago, two conflicting lines of analysis have emerged.
A. The Louisiana Supreme Court Decision in Southland
The earliest decision is the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion
in Southland Investment v. Motor Sales Co., 25 which was rendered
in 1941, eight years after the Deficiency Judgment Act was
222. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108.1(A) (2006) ("[T]he mortgagee or other
creditor may collect from or pursue any debtor, guarantor, or surety for a
deficiency judgment on the secured obligation .... ").
223. This discussion concerns only the rights of the surety under Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 13:4108.2. It is not intended to be a comprehensive
discussion of all rights of a surety under other statutory provisions, including the
rights of a surety to obtain a release under certain circumstances if, without the
surety's consent, there is an impairment of subrogation rights. LA. Cwy. CODE
art. 3062. For an overview of Louisiana suretyship law, see Michael H. Rubin,
Ruminations on Suretyship, 57 LA. L. REv. 565 (1997).
224. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Massengill, 427 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.
1970); Bowl-Opp, Inc. v. Larson, 334 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. La. 1971); Howard
Trucking Co., Inc. v. Stassi, 485 So. 2d 915 (La. 1986); Southland Inv. Co., Inc.
v. Motor Sales Co., 5 So. 2d 324 (La. 1941); Univ. Prop. Corp. v. Fidelity Nat'l
Bank of Baton Rouge, 500 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Gulf Nat'l Bank
at Lake Charles v. Ryan, 432 So. 2d 1122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Domingues
Motors, Inc. v. Lalonde, 417 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, 399 So. 2d 1285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Soileau, 323 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975);
Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Larry Parrott of Gueydan, Inc., 212 So. 2d
860 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); C.I.T. Corp. v. Rosenstock, 205 So. 2d 81 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967); Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Foggin, 177 So. 2d 131 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1965); Gumina v. Dupas, 178 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965);
Wilson v. Brian, 81 So. 2d 142 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Farmerville Bank v.
Sheen, 76 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Simmons v. Clark, 64 So. 2d 520
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1953); Guinn v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 32 So. 2d 613
(La. App. 1 st Cir. 1947).
225. Southland, 5 So. 2d 324.
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enacted. A partnership sold new and used cars; the plaintiff
provided liquidity to the partnership by buying the negotiable notes
executed by Enterprises' customers for car purchases. Each note
was secured by a chattel mortgage on the purchased car,22 6 and the
two partners endorsed each note so that they were liable to
Southland if the original car purchaser defaulted.227 When the
226. Prior to Louisiana's adoption of its version of Article 9 of the U.C.C. in
1990 (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-101 (2002) and following), Louisiana
statutes permitted a lender to obtain a security interest on tangible movable
property through a chattel mortgage. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5351,
repealed by Acts 2001, No. 128, § 18, effective July 1, 2001. For a discussion of
the chattel mortgage law, see Andrew A. Braun, Executory Process and Self-
Help Remedies Under U.C.C. Article 9, 38 LA. B.J. 315 (1991); Michael H.
Rubin, Security Devices, 49 LA. L. REv. 495 (1988); James A. Stuckey,
Louisiana's Non- Uniform Variations in UC. C. Chapter 9, 62 LA. L. REv. 793,
876 (2002).
227. Southland, 5 So. 2d at 324-25:
For cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the Motor Sales Company
is a commercial partnership composed of L. M. Stevens and his wife
and is engaged in the business of selling new and used automobiles in
Haynesville; that it (plaintiff) purchased notes given the defendants as
part payment of the purchase price of automobiles during the years
1936, 1937, and 1938, which notes, secured by chattel mortgage and
vendor's lien on the cars purchased, were endorsed by the defendants;
that some 58 persons whose notes were so acquired by the plaintiff
defaulted in their payments; that the plaintiff, pursuant to an agreement
had with the defendants, repossessed these respective automobiles, 34
(listed and described in a statement made a part of the record and
marked Exhibit A) being sold at private sale and the proceeds thereof
(after deduction of the costs incidental to the sale) applied toward the
liquidation of the obligation on the respective unpaid notes, the
aggregate amount remaining due thereon being $3,617.50; and that the
remaining 24 automobiles (listed and described in a statement made a
part of the record and marked Exhibit B) are still in the possession of
the plaintiff, the balance due thereon being $4,206.93.
The facts of this case, as revealed by the record, show that the
defendant Motor Sales Company, a company engaged in the business
of buying and selling new and second-hand automobiles, entered into
an agreement with the Southland Investment Company, Inc., whereby
the sales consummated by the defendant company were refinanced by
the investment company's purchase of the notes given to the defendant
company in part payment of the automobiles purchased from them.
Under this agreement the plaintiff was to reserve a portion of the
amount paid for the notes in order that a fund might be accumulated to
offset any loss the plaintiff might incur through these transactions. The
plaintiff was charged with the duty of repossessing any cars upon
which the installments were not paid and of turning them over to the
defendant company within 90 days. It was understood that the
defendants' liability, irrespective of the unconditional endorsement on
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partnership could not pay the debt, the partners agreed to a private
sale of the vehicles by the plaintiff.
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the partners' attempt to
use the Deficiency Judgment Act as a bar when, after the private
sales did not bring sufficient sums to pay off the debt, Southland
attempted to collect the balance from the sureties. 228 The court's
analysis is short and begins with the statement that the Deficiency
Judgment Act is for the protection of the mortgage debtor 229 (and,
by implication, not sureties or endorsers). 230 The court found that
the cars were sold "at private sale for the best price obtainable with
the consent and acquiescence of the defendants, for the best
interest of all parties concerned,, 231 and that, under these
circumstances, the endorsers were liable.
Southland was decided under the former Negotiable
Instruments Law (the "NIL"), the forerunner of articles 3 and 4 of
the U.C.C. 232 The result of Southland is an implicit recognition that
the back of the notes, would only begin when these repossessed cars
were so turned over to them.
228. Id. Under Louisiana law, if the U.C.C. does not provide specific rules
for endorsers, Louisiana suretyship law controls. See Rubin, Ruminations on
Suretyship, supra note 223. The same general rule applied under the forerunner
of the U.C.C. which was in effect in Louisiana at the time the Southland case
was decided. See discussion infra note 232.
229. Southland, 5 So. 2d at 326. The court stated:
Unquestionably [the Deficiency Judgment Act] was enacted for the
benefit and protection of the mortgage debtor and, ordinarily, under the
express provisions of Act No. 64 of 1904 (known as the Negotiable
Instruments Act) "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is
discharged .... [b]y any act which discharges the instrument." Section
120. According to the record as made up in this case, however, the cars
listed and described in Exhibit A were repossessed and sold by the
plaintiff at private sale for the best price obtainable with the consent
and acquiescence of the defendants, for the best interest of all parties
concerned. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for any amount remaining unpaid on
the notes defendant transferred to it under the transactions listed in
Exhibit A, which, as shown by the record, is $3,617.50.
Id. (emphasis added).
230. The court does not characterize the endorsers as sureties, although there
is language in the opinion indicating that they may have been bound with the
makers of notes in solido, but it also recognizes that endorsers are only bound
"secondarily." Id. at 325-26.
231. Id.
232. The Negotiable Instruments Law was originally enacted under 1904 La.
Acts No. 64 and was later codified as Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 7:1
and following. However, in 1974 the NIL statutes were repealed. This
legislation was eventually superseded by Louisiana's adoption of its version of
Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. at Revised Statutes sections 10:3-101 and
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the Deficiency Judgment Act does not extinguish the debt but
merely extinguishes the personal obligation of the primary obligor.
This implicit recognition occurs because, under the NIL, the
discharge of the maker discharges the endorsers. Because
Southland held that the endorsers could not take advantage of the
Deficiency Judgment Act's bar against the maker, it was
recognizing that the debt was not extinguished and that the maker
was not "discharged" in the sense of canceling the debt; rather,
there was simply an inability to collect from the maker personally
without extinguishing the debt. This is akin to the rule that the
natural obligation to pay a debt remains even if the debtor has a
personal defense, such as minority.
23 3
Southland's holding and rationale would seem to create an
insurmountable barrier to sureties and endorsers who seek to use
the Deficiency Judgment Act to bar claims against them even
though the debtor can claim the benefit of the Act. This is because
Southland expressly pointed out that the Deficiency Judgment
Act's purpose is to protect the debtor who owns the encumbered
property; by implication, the Act does not protect those who may
be liable on the debt but who are not owners of the collateral.
Southland, however, has not created a single line of uniformjurisprudence. One line of cases follows the reasoning in
Southland.234 These opinions reflect an understanding that, because
the Deficiency Judgment Act's purpose is to protect debtors and
owners, sureties and endorsers are not entitled to notice of the
foreclosure sale and are not entitled to appoint an appraiser.235
following and at sections 10:4-101 and following, respectively. Such provisions
were extensively reworked by 1992 La. Acts No. 1133.
233. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1762 (2009).
234. See Univ. Prop. Corp. v. Fid. Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge, 500 So. 2d
888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 762 (La. 1987) (using
Southland to support a "balancing" test to determine whether a disposition of the
collateral without appraisal should bar a deficiency judgment against either the
debtor or the surety). The facts in University Properties, however, arose prior to
the Deficiency Judgment Act amendments allowing voluntary work-outs, and
the court held that these amendments were not retroactive. See also Farmerville
Bank v. Scheen, 76 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955) (relying on Southland,
held that the Deficiency Judgment Act was not available as a defense to a surety
who had agreed to a private sale of a car on which the creditor held a security
interest and who, prior to the sale, also agreed in writing to be liable for the
deficiency).
235. See Gumina v. Dupas, 178 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
179 So. 2d 430 (La. 1965). A son apparently endorsed a mortgage note his
parents had executed for the purchase of property. While the court referred to
the son as a solidary obligor, it appears that the court found that he became
bound by endorsing the note. The court states that he "intervened" into the
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These cases hold that sureties and endorsers cannot claim the
protection of the Act236 even if the creditor sells the collateral
without appraisal.237
mortgage, but a mortgage is an in rem accessory obligation that secures a
principal obligation. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3282. The mortgage is not itself a
personal principal obligation.
A foreclosure suit occurred which resulted in a deficiency. The sale was
allegedly conducted with appraisal; thus, the creditor had not violated the
Deficiency Judgment Act as to the debtor. The endorser-son filed bankruptcy
and obtained a discharge; the creditor subsequently pursued and was awarded a
default judgment against the son. The court found that the bankruptcy discharge
defense had been waived. On the issue of whether the son was entitled to notice
of the judicial sale or a right to appoint an appraiser, the court rejected that
claim, relying on Southland for the proposition that it was the for debtor-owner
that the Deficiency Judgment Act exists, not an endorser or surety. Gumina, 178
So. 2d at 295-96.
Gumina's result is in accord with the later due process holding in Mennonite
v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), that those entitled to notice of a foreclosure sale
are those whose property interests (such as an ownership in or a mortgage on the
property bearing sold) are affected by the judicial sale. For more on Mennonite,
see Michael H. Rubin & Marshall Grodner, Recent Developments, Security
Devices, 53 LA. L. REV. 969 (1993). See also supra notes 144 and 158. Accord
Sec. Nat'l Trust v. Moore, 639 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994). Cf Pioneer
Bank & Trust Co. v. Foggin, 177 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 179
So. 2d 18 (La. 1965) (involving removal of collateral from the state and a
surety's ineffectual attempt to be released because of alleged impairment of
subrogation).
236. See Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Massengill, 427 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.
1970); Gulf Nat'l Bank at Lake Charles v. Ryan, 432 So. 2d 1122 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Soileau, 323 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975).
237. See Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Larry Parrott of Gueydan, Inc.,
212 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). This was another financing case whose
facts were similar Southland. Commercial Credit bought secured commercial
paper from the defendant representing equipment sales to third parties, and the
defendant had a written agreement to "repurchase" the secured equipment if the
third party defaulted on the note. Commercial Credit sold the equipment at a
private sale. In its initial opinion, without citing Southland, the Commercial
Credit court found that the defendant (who was similar to that of a surety,
although its obligation was to repurchase the equipment and not to directly pay
the debt of the third person) could not take advantage of the Deficiency
Judgment Act. After holding initially that the Deficiency Judgment Act applied,
the Commercial Credit court granted a rehearing on the Act and on the
applicability of Southland and reaffirmed its earlier ruling, stating:
Rehearing was granted in the instant case for the reason that some
members of this Court were of the opinion that the Limited Liability
Plan Agreement as set forth in the original opinion herein violated
LSA-R.S. 13:4106 et seq., commonly referred to as the Deficiency
Judgment Act, for the reason that the property repossessed by plaintiff
was sold at private sale without benefit of appraisement. After due
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A divergent line of jurisprudence has developed, however;
these cases purport to distinguish Southland and hold that sureties
have been released when the debtor can claim the benefits of the
Deficiency Judgment Act.
B. The Cases that Distinguish Southland and Allow a Surety to
Raise the Deficiency Judgment Act Defense
A line of cases distinguishing Southland has developed; the
key opinions are Simmons,238 C.I. T.,239 and Bowl-Opp.24° When
one examines each of these cases, however, it is questionable how
firm a foundation they provide to sureties who claim that the
Deficiency Judgment Act protects them.
Simmons barred a deficiency judgment against a pledgee
following a judicial sale without appraisal. Mr. and Mrs. Holmes
had executed a note secured by a mortgage on their property as a
loan made by Simmons; the Clarks had pledged their own note
secured by a mortgage, to secure the Holmes' obligations.24f
consideration of the matter we hereby reinstate our original decree. In
the case of Southland Investment Co. v. Motor Sales Co., 198 La .1028,
5 So.2d 324, the Supreme Court of this State held that the deficiency
judgment statute was enacted for the benefit and protection of the
mortgage debtor and nowhere does the statute refer to or mention
public policy towards or relief for parties secondarily or otherwise
obligated for the indebtedness, such as an endorser. The Court also
held that the provisions of the statute pronouncing the principle of the
public policy were inapplicable to the case of an endorser whose rights
and remedies are prescribed and governed by other applicable laws,
particularly the articles of the Code pertaining to suretyship. The
Southland Investment Company case, supra, was cited with approval in
Farmerville Bank v. Scheen, 76 So.2d 581 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1954), and
in Gumina v. Dupas, 178 So.2d 291 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1965). For the
reasons set forth in the above cited cases, it is our opinion that the
Deficiency Judgment Act does not apply to the instant case.
212 So. 2d at 864 (emphasis added).
238. Simmons v. Clark, 64 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
239. C.I.T. Corp. v. Rosenstock, 205 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
240. Bowl-Opp, Inc. v. Larson, 334 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. La. 1971).
241. Under the Civil Code pledge provisions that were applicable to this
transaction at the time, one could pledge a note to secure the obligations of
another. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3158 (2009). Today, of course, that type of security
interest is covered by U.C.C. article 9. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-101 (2002)
and following. The pledge of a secured note to secure a principal obligation is
the basis of the Louisiana collateral mortgage. For more on collateral mortgages,
see Max Nathan & Anthony Dunbar, The Collateral Mortgage: Logic &
Experience, 49 LA. L. REv. 39 (1988); Max Nathan & H. Gayle Marshall,
Forum Juridicum, 36 LA. L. REv. 973 (1976); Max Nathan & H. Gayle
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Simmons foreclosed on the Holmes' property without appraisal
and then sought a deficiency against the Clarks. In barring the
deficiency against the Clarks, the court relied on provisions of the
suretyship articles of the Civil Code, even though there was no
language in the case to indicate that the Clarks were sureties.
Louisiana law has long held that a pledge (which is a physical
transfer of an asset to a creditor, with the creditor having the right
to hold it until paid or sell it upon default and get a privilege on the
proceeds of the sale) 242 is completely separate from suretyship,
which is a personal oblifation where someone undertakes to pay
the debtors of another. 24 Pledge is a "real right" under Louisiana
law and suretyship is a "personal right.",244 To the extent that the
Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REv. 497 (1973); Michael Rubin
& R. Marshall Grodner, Recent Developments, Security Devices, 53 LA. L. REv.
969 (1993); Michael Rubin, David Willenzik & Marie Moore, Is the Collateral
Mortgage Obsolete, 41 LA. B.J. 529 (1994); David Willenzik, Future Advance
Priority Rights of Louisiana Collateral Mortgages: Legislative Revisions, New
Rules, anda Modern Alternative, 55 LA. L. REv. 1 (1994).
242. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133 (defining pledge); id. arts. 3164, 3165
(regarding rights under Pawn upon default); id. art. 3179 (regarding rights under
antichresis upon default). A key Supreme Court decision on the pledge of notes to
secure the obligations of another is Succession ofPicard, 115 So. 2d 817 (La. 1959).
243. For example, in Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., the court held that one
who assumes a pledged note secured by a mortgage does not assume personal
liability on the underlying principal obligation that the pledged note secures. 381
So. 2d 385, 391 (La. 1980). The court stated:
In this instance the obligation assumed by GSA was clear and specific.
GSA assumed only mortgages, liens and judgments extant (outstanding
and enforceable) against the property it purchased, on the date of its
acquisition. GSA did not undertake to assume any personal obligation
of its vendor or any other antecedent owner of the property in question.
GSA neither endorsed the hand note nor expressly agreed to pay it. The
record is devoid of an express written instrument binding GSA to pay
the personal obligation of the maker of the hand note involved herein. It
follows that GSA may not be held liable for such personal liability. La.
C.C. Article 2278(3).
Id.
244. The Louisiana Civil Code makes clear that suretyship is a personal right
while pledge is a real right. Civil Code article 3035 defines suretyship as a
contract "by which a person binds himself to a creditor to fulfill the obligation of
another," while article 3133 defines pledge as a contract where "one debtor
gives something to his creditor as security for his debt." LA. Crv. CODE art. 3133
(emphasis added). See also Thomas A. Harrell, Security Devices, 45 LA. L. REv.
559, 559 (1984) ("All mortgages and pledges are by their nature "in rem," if by
that one means that no other responsibility for satisfaction of the principal
obligation rests upon the mortgagor or pledgor by virtue of his contract and that
each creates a real right over the property to have it sold and the proceeds
applied to satisfy the obligation it secures."). Louisiana law is in accord with the
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Simmons' analysis depends upon application of suretyship articles,
the language is dicta, for there was no suretyship. In opinions
after Simmons, the Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that one who pledges a note secured by a mortgage
undertakes personal liability on the principal obligation the pledge
secures. 246 Moreover, later decisions have rejected Simmons'
argument that sureties are entitled to claim an impairment of their
rights of subrogation if a sale of the debtor's property occurs
without notice to the sureties.
247
In C.L T.,248 an endorser of notes secured by a chattel mortgage
claimed that the Deficiency Judgment Act protected him following
a judicial sale with appraisal because he was not a party to the prior
executory proceedings and because the sale denied him his
subrogation rights against the debtor. There was no question that
the sale was with appraisal249 and that the debtor could not claim
Deficiency Judgment Act protection; nevertheless, the court found
French rules at the time the Civil Code was adopted. For example, see Planiol,
who cautioned that:
One should avoid confusing suretyship with the following-contracts:
The contract of "porte-fort" which gives rise to a principal obligation.
The "porte-fort" who stands as security for another, resembles the
surety in that he is not bound unless the third party does not satisfy the
creditor; but he never becomes an accessory debtor of another. In
effect, as long as the third person whom he has guaranteed is not
bound, he remains the sole debtor; as soon as the third party obligates
himself, the guarantor is freed.
2 Marcel Planiol, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIviL No. 2325 (La. State
Law Inst. trans., 1959).
245. For a similar case in which the court used a combination of the
suretyship articles and the Deficiency Judgment Act to bar a claim against a
pledgor, see Wilson v. Brian, 81 So. 2d 142 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955). That
opinion suffers from the same analytical problems that infect Simmons.
Moreover, Wilson was decided six months after Farmerville Bank v. Scheen, 76
So. 2d 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955), which found that an actual surety was liable;
yet Wilson did not cite Farmerville. Further, while Wilson cited Southland, it did
not explain why the result or analysis should be different in Wilson than was
mandated by the Supreme Court in Southland. Wilson, 81 So. 2d at 144.
246. Kaplan, 381 So. 2d 385. In addition, if what a third party has been
pledged is a collateral mortgage package, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held
that a collateral mortgage package is an in rem obligation that creates no
personal liability for the pledgor. Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d
367 (La. 2001). For more references on collateral mortgages, supra note 241.
247. Sec. Nat'l Trust v. Moore, 639 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
248. C.I.T. Corp. v. Rosenstock, 205 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
249. Following the foreclosure, the creditor had converted the executory suit
against the borrower into an ordinary proceeding for a deficiency. C.I.T., 205
So. 2d at 82-83.
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that the Deficiency Judgment Act did bar the creditor's claim
against the endorser because of the suretyship articles of the Civil
Code as they existed at the time. C.I.T., however, did not cite
Southland. Later courts have recognized that C.I.T.'s holding has
been abrogated, at least insofar as it held that a surety's lack of
notice of executory proceedings gives the surety any rights to
complain about impairment of subrogation or any other matter.25 °
Bowl-Opp 251 held that the Deficiency Judgment Act could be
used as a bar by endorsers following a public auction without
appraisal; the auction was authorized by a bankruptcy court order.
Bowl-Opp distinguished Southland and its progeny reasoning that
in those cases, unlike in Bowl-Opp, there was an agreement
between the creditor and surety about the sale of the collateral. The
Bowl-Opp court chose to rely upon the C.I.T. and Simmons cases
for the proposition that when a surety is "not a party to any
agreement between the maker primarily liable and the holder of the
note relative to repossession or sale of the mortgaged," the surety
can use the Deficiency Judgment Act. Bowl-Opp does not discuss
the underlying rationale of Southland (that the Act protects only
debtor-owners), does not address the fact that the Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 13:4016 (the operative section of the
Deficiency Judgment Act) contains no language concerning
sureties, and does not explain why the surety's knowledge and
agreement to the sale of collateral is pertinent at all when,252 the
Act operates as a bar to a deficiency against the debtor regardless
of the debtor's intent or knowledge. Moreover, the underlying
basis of Bowl-Opp--that the Deficiency Judgment Act applies to a
sale ordered by a bankruptcy court-has been legislatively
overruled.253
As can be seen, there are logical problems within Simmons,
C.I.T., and Bowl-Opp; yet, later cases have relied on them to bar
claims against sureties. These later decisions find persuasive the
250. See Sec. Nat 7 Trust, 639 So. 2d at 376 ("[A]n executory proceeding and
judicial sale of mortgaged property, after due notice to and appraisal by the
owners of the property, does not 'unjustly impair' the collateral nor discharge an
accommodation party not served or named as a defendant therein.").
251. See Bowl-Opp, Inc. v. Larson, 334 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. La. 1971).
252. It must be remembered that when Bowl-Opp was decided, the "work-
out" provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 13:4108.1 and 13:4108.2
had not yet been enacted, allowing a creditor and debtor to agree to a deficiency
following a sale without appraisal.
253. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108(3) (2006), enacted by 1986 La.
Acts No. 489, §2 and 1989 La. Acts No. 137, § 8 (effective Sept. 1, 1989)
(stating that a deficiency judgment is not barred by a "sale pursuant to an order




argument that it is unfair to allow the debtor to have a Deficiency




There is one case from the Louisiana Supreme Court that
appears to follow the jurisprudential line that diverges from
Southland. In Howard Trucking255 the supreme court found,
without discussing the matter in depth, that sureties who were
shareholders of the borrower under a lease could raise a Deficiency
Judgment Act claim. Howard Trucking, however, did not cite
Southland, and its decision turned on a lease analysis that was
legislatively overruled by the enactment of the Lease of Movables
law.256 Thus, it may be questionable whether Howard Trucking
remains viable today.
C. What Should the Rule Be?
The authors assert that substantial deference should be given
Southland, which was the earliest Louisiana Supreme Court case
on the issue and the one decided closest in time to the enactment of
the Deficiency Judgment Act. Southland's main point was that the
Deficiency Judgment Act exists to protect the debtor-owner of
property, not sureties. On the other hand, later cases have seized on
Southland's emphasis on the agreement of the surety to the sale to
support a practice of allowing sureties to use a Deficiency
Judgment Act defense when there was no such agreement. It is
difficult to find a statutory basis for a result which protects only
those sureties who do not consent to sales that would otherwise
trigger the Deficiency Judgment Act.
The contrasting lines of cases have deeper problems, however,
for they depend either upon a bright-line public policy application
of the Deficiency Judgment Act to all sureties (a purported "bright-
line" not explicitly found in the Act or in Southland) or upon
equitable theories that a creditor should not be able to collect from
the surety when it cannot collect from the debtor (under the
rationale that this would allow the creditor to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly-that is, sell collateral without appraisal and
then collect a deficiency from someone).
254. See Domingues Motors, Inc. v. Lalonde, 417 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1982); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, 399 So. 2d 1285 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981).
255. See Howard Trucking Co., Inc. v. Stassi, 485 So. 2d 915 (La.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 948 (1986).
256. Howard Trucking re-characterized a lease as a sale, despite the parties'
stated intent. The Lease of Movables Act requires that courts honor as leases
documents the parties intend to be leases. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3301 (1997)
and following.
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What these cases do not discuss, however, is that the essence of
suretyship is that a surety may have to pay a creditor even if the
surety cannot collect from the debtor. Sureties have never been
able to assert certain personal defenses of the principal obligor,
257
and it seems clear that the bar that the Deficiency Judgment Act
raises is just such a personal defense; the Deficiency Judgment Act
does not extinguish the debt but merely prevents a personal claim
against the debtor-owner.
258
It is submitted that a court could validly balance interests of the
creditor and the surety by allowing the creditor to pursue the surety
for a deficiency after giving credit for the value of the collateral at
the time of either the non-judicial foreclosure or a judicial
foreclosure without appraisal, and in either case the creditor must
bear the burden of demonstrating the value of the collateral at the
time of the creditor's realization on it. This is the same type of
burden that a creditor bears under the U.C.C. It is also fair to the
surety who understands that when the suretyship is undertaken, if
the debtor does not pay and cannot pay, the surety must pay.
It is also submitted that it is possible that courts may draw a
distinction between legal and commercial sureties on one hand and
257. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3046 (2009) (The surety may assert against the
creditor any defense to the principal obligation that the principal obligor could
assert except lack of capacity or discharge in bankruptcy of the principal
obligor.). Official Law Institute comment (a) states that the article reproduces
the substance of Louisiana Civil Code article 3060 (1870) and the second
sentence to Louisiana Civil Code article 3036 (1870).
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3060 (1870) ("The surety may oppose to the creditor all
the exceptions belonging to the principal debtor, and which are inherent to the
debt; but he cannot oppose exceptions which are personal to the debtor.").
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3036 (1870) ("A man may, however, become surety for
an obligation of which the principal debtor might get a discharge by an
exception merely personal to him; such as that of being a minor, or a married
woman.").
258. See discussion regarding LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 13:4106(B) at supra
notes 217 and 218. For example, a surety is always liable even if the surety
cannot collect through subrogation against the debtor or through reimbursement.
Illustrations of this include situations when the debtor becomes a bankrupt or
when one becomes the surety of a minor; in either case, the surety cannot assert
that defense against the creditor and must pay the debt to the full extent of the
suretyship agreement. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3046 (2009). The fact that in both
cases (bankruptcy and minority) the debtor has a defense to the personal
obligation does not relieve the surety of his or her obligation to the creditor.
Second, even if the surety is not fully liable, and assuming that the courts try to
broadly read the public policy statement in the Deficiency Judgment Act (which
applies only to debtors) to extend the Act to sureties, it appears one could argue
that the surety has only been impaired to the extent that the surety's rights of
subrogation against the collateral have been impaired.
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ordinary sureties on the other.259 There are two reasons for this.
First, the Deficiency Judgment Act itself draws a distinction
between commercial and consumer transactions in the work-out
provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 13:4108.1 and
13:4108.2. Second, under the Civil Code, ordinary and commercial
sureties are subject to different rules.2 60 This is because, under the
suretyship articles, when an impairment of subrogation occurs
without the sureties' prior consent, an ordinary surety is
completely released while the commercial surety is released only
to the extent of the impairment.261
The authors submit that the following rule is workable,
defensible, and follows from the express language of the suretyship
articles and the Deficiency Judgment Act:
1. Neither a debtor nor the debtor's sureties may waive the
creditor's compliance with the Deficiency Judgment Act.
2. If the creditor forecloses in violation of the Deficiency
Judgment Act, thereby barring a deficiency against the
debtor:
a. The creditor may collect the deficiency from a
commercial or legal surety, but only for the lesser of
the difference between the debt owed at the point of the
creditor's violation of the Deficiency Judgment Act
and: (i) the value of the collateral at the time of the
creditor's violation of the Deficiency Judgment Act or
(ii) the amount of the security interest on the collateral
at the time of the creditor's violation of the Deficiency
Judgment Act. The creditor bears the burden of proof to
show the value of the collateral at the time of the
disposition of the property.262
259. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3041 (noting that there "are three types of suretyship:
commercial suretyship, legal suretyship, and ordinary suretyship;" articles 3042
to 3044 subsequently define each type of suretyship).
260. The definitions of commercial and ordinary sureties are found in Civil
Code articles 3041 to 3044. Ordinary sureties (those who are neither commercial
nor legal sureties) are entitled to an interpretation of their contract which is
"strictly construed in favor of the surety." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3044.
261. Id. art. 3062.
262. The rationale here is that this rule is in accordance with Civil Code
article 3062, which partially releases a commercial surety who has not consented
in advance to an impairment of the surety's subrogation rights; the partial
release under Civil Code article 3062 is the "extent the surety is prejudiced by
the action of the creditor." It is submitted that the prejudice here equals
difference between the value of the collateral at the time of the creditor's
violation of the Deficiency Judgment Act and the debt owed at that point.
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b. The creditor may not collect any deficiency from an
ordinary surety.
There are three important things to note about this proposed
rule. First, it is entirely consistent with the Deficiency Judgment
Act and the Civil Code articles on suretyship. Second, this rule
does not apply when the work-out provisions of Revised Statutes
sections 13:4108.1 and 4108.2 are used, for in those instances the
debtor is not released; this rule applies only if the debtor is
completely released from personal liability by virtue of the
Deficiency Judgment Act bar. Third, this rule focuses on the value
of the collateral at the time of the creditor's action, not the face
amount of the mortgage or the amount the property sold for at the
private sale.
The following examples illustrate how the rule would work for
commercial sureties.
Example 0: A corporation has given a mortgage on land for
$100,000. A shareholder of the corporation is a surety for the
corporation's obligations. The mortgaged property is sold by
the creditor at a judicial sale without appraisal; the judicial sale
brings $45,000. At the time of the sale, the debtor's obligation
to the creditor was $100,000.
Comment on Example 0: Under the Deficiency Judgment Act,
the failure of the creditor to foreclose by judicial process with
appraisal bars a deficiency against the debtor.
Concerning the surety, who in this context is a commercial
surety,264 and using the proposed rule, the surety is released to the
extent of the difference between the value of the collateral at the
time of the creditor's violation of the Deficiency Judgment Act and
the debt owed at that point. The creditor bears the burden of proof
that the property was worth only $45,000 at the time of the sale. If
the creditor meets its burden of proof, the surety is liable for only
$65,000 (the difference between the $100,000 debt and the
$45,000 value of the property at the time of the judicial sale).
Example P: Assume the same facts as in Example 0, but the
creditor fails in its burden of proof in showing that the property
was worth only $45,000; the surety is able to show that, despite
the $45,000 paid at the sheriff's sale, fair market value of the
property at that time was really $60,000.
263. This rule is consistent with the complete release that ordinary sureties are
given under Civil Code article 3062, when the creditor impairs the subrogation
rights of the ordinary surety without the ordinary surety's prior consent.




Comment on Example P: Using the proposed rule, the surety's
liability is only $40,000 (the difference between the $100,000 debt
and the value of the collateral at the time of its sale).
Example Q: A partnership has given a mortgage on land for
$140,000. A partner of the entity is a surety for the
partnership's obligations. The mortgaged property is sold by
the creditor at a judicial sale without appraisal; the judicial sale
brings $80,000. At the time of the sale, the debtor's obligation
to the creditor was $300,000.
Under the Deficiency Judgment Act, the failure of the
creditor to foreclose by judicial process with appraisal bars a
deficiency against the debtor.
In its pursuit of the surety for a deficiency, the creditor
attempts to show that the property was worth only $80,000 at
the time of the judicial sale (the amount of the price paid at the
judicial sale), but the creditor cannot meet its burden of proof.
The surety (who is a commercial surety265 ) is able to show that
the fair market value of the property is actually $200,000 at the
time of the sale.
Comment on Example Q: Using the proposed rule, the surety is
liable for $160,000 ($300,000 debt minus $140,000 face amount of
the mortgage). The reason is that no matter how much the fair
market value of the property exceeded the face amount of the
mortgage, all the creditor could have obtained at the Jidicial sale
was the face amount of the mortgage ($140,000). Since the
creditor never could have collected more than $140,000 on its
mortgage, it is this amount that determines the extent to which the
surety's rights of subrogation are impaired, for the surety could not
collect more from the mortgaged property under a mortgage
foreclosure than the face amount of the mortgage.
XII. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S APPROACH TO
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
Unlike the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act, Louisiana's
version of U.C.C. Article 9267 takes a different approach. Rather
265. A surety for a partnership is a commercial surety. Id. art. 3042.
266. At the judicial sale, any amounts received in excess of the face amount
of the mortgage goes to inferior secured creditors and then to the debtor. See
Section VII, supra.
267. Louisiana's version of U.C.C. article 9 can be found at Revised Statutes
sections 10:9-101 to 10:9-710. Louisiana statutes formerly used the term
"Commercial Laws" rather than Uniform Commercial Code because, in a
number of respects, Louisiana's version was not and is not identical to the
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than being concerned with procedural requirements (was there a
judicial sale, was it with appraisal, and was the appraisal valid), the
U.C.C. instead looks at both the objective manifestations of the
sale and its substantive results.
Under Louisiana's version of the U.C.C., just as in the national
version, a deficiency judgment is allowed as long as the collateral
was disposed of in a "commercially reasonable" manner.268 In both
the national and Louisiana versions, the term "commercially
reasonable" is deliberately not defined because the test is
functional, not procedural, and depends upon the facts of each
situation.
The late William D. Hawkland, former Chancellor of the LSU
Law School, the pre-eminent expert in the U.C.C. during his
lifetime, and a member of the U.C.C. Editorial Board, has written
that that omission of a definition of "commercial reasonableness"
was ". . . the result of design. The draftsman felt that it would be
unwise to try to place finite limits on the overriding standard of fair
play that was to circumscribe all dispositions by the secured party
under Chapter 9.,,269 He went on to state that commercial
reasonableness "is a general standard, something akin to other
supereminent provisions such as 'reasonable man,' 'reasonable
time' and 'good faith' that are used throughout the Anglo-
American legal system .... ,
270
Rather than provide a definition, the U.C.C. and Louisiana's
version provide three of the types of sales that could be considered
commercially reasonable: when the property is sold in the ordinary
U.C.C. In 2006, however, the Louisiana U.C.C. was amended by 2006 La. Acts
No. 533, §1, and the provisions are now called the "Uniform Commercial
Code." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-201 (2003).
268. Revised Statutes section 10:9-615 and U.C.C. section 9-615 both allow
pursuit of a deficiency from the obligor where there is no surplus remaining
after application of the proceeds of a sale of collateral to the debtor's
outstanding obligation. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-615; U.C.C. § 9-615
(1996). Both Revised Statutes section 10:9-625 and U.C.C. section 9-625
require compliance with the provisions of the chapter, including disposition in a
commercially reasonable manner and reserve the power to judicial injunction
from further collection efforts in the event of non-compliance. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-625; U.C.C. § 9-625. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-
610(b); U.C.C. § 9-610(b) ("Every aspect of a disposition of collateral,
including the method, manner, time, place, and other items, must be
commercially reasonable.").
269. William Hawkland, HAwKLAND's HANDBOOK ON CHAPTER 9
LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW (1990) (quoted with approval in Ford Motor




course of business; when the property is sold for the same price as
would be obtainable in the ordinary course of business; or when
the property is sold in a manner that is designed to achieve a fair
price.
Note that under the U.C.C., the fact that collateral is sold
through judicial foreclosure or by a private sale is not
determinative; likewise, whether an appraisal has been obtained
prior to the sale also is not determinative. 272 Under the U.C.C., the
question is not whether the creditor cleared procedural hurdles
273
but rather whether (1) the price obtained for the property was a fair
one, regardless of the procedure, or whether (2) the sale was by a
commercially reasonable practice regardless of the price obtained.
Despite this seemingly fluid and functional test, however, the
U.C.C. contains a check on creditors. The U.C.C. presumes that
every sale of secured collateral always results in satisfaction of the
debt (that is, the presumption does not allow the creditor to collect
a deficiency). The only way the creditor can overcome this
presumption is to prove that the sale was conducted in a
commercially reasonable manner.
274
271. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-607(c); U.C.C. § 9-607(c). Both
sections state that a creditor proceeds in a commercially reasonable when it:
(1) undertakes to collect from or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or
other person obligated on collateral, and;
(2) is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or
limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.
Both Revised Statutes section 10:9-627(b) and U.C.C. section 9-627(b) outline
examples of transactions that are considered commercially reasonable. These
include dispositions made:
(1) in the usual manner on any recognized market;
(2) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or
(3) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among
dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.
As was stated in Hall v. Owen County State Bank, discussing Indiana's version
of the U.C.C. and national U.C.C. jurisprudence: "Because the statutory
definition of a commercially reasonable sale is vague, and because a judgment
as to whether or not a sale was reasonable will generally depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case, many courts have held this to be a
question of fact." 370 N.E.2d 918, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
272. Note that none of the provisions identified and excerpted in supra note
271 make mention of an appraisal as a requirement.
273. See Section VI regarding the requirements of the Deficiency Judgment
Act.
274. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-626(a)(2). If a creditor seeks a
deficiency, the debtor or "secondary obligor" (which includes a surety) may
object, and then "the secured party has the burden of establishing that the
collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance
with this Part." Id.
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The Louisiana U.C.C. provides an alternative to the Louisiana
Deficiency Judgment Act. Louisiana courts have recognized that
even though there has not been a foreclosure with appraisal, a
deficiency may be obtainable under the Louisiana U.C.C. for
security interests perfected under that statute."' The U.C.C. allows
for disposition of collateral by private sales,27 6 by one or more
contracts,277 by sales as a unit or in ,arcels,278 and by sales "at any
time and place and on any terms."27PThe U.C.C. allows the parties
to agree to the terms of notice that must be given. 28 The U.C.C.
allows the parties to contract, within reason, on the parameters of
commercial reasonability. 28
1
Thus, a creditor whose collateral consists of both immovable
property (which is always subject to the Deficiency Judgment Act)
and a U.C.C. security interest on movables and other assets
covered by the U.C.C.282 may want to use two different procedures
to convert the loan collateral into cash. The creditor may wish to
proceed by executory process with appraisal under Louisiana's
Deficiency Judgment Act to obtain a deficiency from the sale of
the immovable, while, on the other hand, employing a private sale
of the movables pursuant to the U.C.C. Of course, as expressly
recognized by Louisiana's positive law and the U.C.C., the
flexibility provided by the U.C.C. is conditioned on the disposition
of the collateral being commercially reasonable.
283
The question then, is what is a commercially reasonable sale?
For transactions where the collateral consists of consumer goods, the creditor
must provide certain statutorily mandated explanations before seeking a
deficiency. Id. § 10:9-616(b).
275. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Melancon, 77 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
276. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b); U.C.C. §9-610(b) (provided
that the sale is commercially reasonable, private sales are expressly allowed).
277. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b); U.C.C. §9-610(b).
278. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b); U.C.C. §9-610(b).
279. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b); U.C.C. §9-610(b).
280. Revised Statutes section 10:9-611 and U.C.C. section 9-611 provide the
general notification provisions for disposition of collateral; however, both
Revised Statutes section 10:9-624(a) and U.C.C. section 9-624(a) provide that
the debtor may waive that right by agreement.
281. Revised Statutes section 10:9-610 and U.C.C. section 9-610 allow
parties to agree to the time, place, manner, and terms of disposition of collateral.
282. Revised Statutes section 10:9-109 sets forth the scope of Louisiana's
U.C.C. concerning assets subject to a security interest.
283. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b) and U.C.C. § 9-610(b), both
opening with the sentence: "Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including
the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially




A brief examination of non-Louisiana case law arising under
the U.C.C. may be instructive in outlining the parameters of a
commercially reasonable sale. There are many treatises and
surveys about commercially reasonable sales,284 and this Article is
not intended to duplicate these or to be a comprehensive review of
this field. Rather, the purpose of this portion of the Article is to
illustrate some of the common issues arising in the national
jurisprudence. While Louisiana civilian courts generally do not
look to common law jurisdictions for guidance on statutory terms,
cases arising in other jurisdictions may provide persuasive
authority in the context of a statute whose Louisiana provisions are
identical to the national U.C.C. This approach is one that the
Louisiana Supreme Court has used involving other statutes.
285
A. Sales in Recognized Markets
Just as the Deficiency Judgment Act contains an exception for
sales conducted without appraisal through the New York Stock
Exchange, American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the Chicago
Commodity Exchange,286 cases from other jurisdictions have found
that a commercially reasonable sale occurs when it is conducted in
the usual manner and for the current price on a "recognized
market." National Uniform Commercial Code comment (4) to this
provision notes that the term "recognized market" is "quite
limited" and applies "only to markets in which there are
standardized price quotations for property that is essentially
284. See, e.g., WILLIAM HAWKLAND ET AL., HAWKLAND U.C.C. SERIES § 7-
210:04 (2009); Gary Spivey, Uniform Commercial Code: Burden of Proof as to
Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral, 59 A.L.R. 3D 369 (1974);
Richard Tinney, What Is "Commercially Reasonable" Disposition of Collateral
Required by U. C. C. § 9-504(3), 7 A.L.R. 4th 308 (1981).
285. See, e.g., Giroir v. S. La. Med. Ctr., Div. of Hosps., 475 So. 2d 1040,
1042 (La. 1985) ("Because La. C.C.P. art. 1153 is based on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c), its doctrinal commentaries and judicial interpretations are
strongly persuasive as to the meaning and application of the Louisiana article.").
See also Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 755 So. 2d 226, 234 (La. 2000),
which uses this principle and quotes with approval from State v. Foret, 628 So.
2d 1116, 1122-23 (La. 1993):
Since much of the Louisiana Code of Evidence is patterned after the
Federal Rules of Evidence in an attempt to facilitate a "movement
towards a uniform national law of evidence," it seems appropriate for
Louisiana Courts to, "especially where the language of the Louisiana
Code is identical or virtually identical with that used ... in the federal
rules" utilize this "body of persuasive authority which may be
instructive in interpreting the Louisiana Code."
286. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4108(1), (2) (2006).
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fungible, such as stock exchanges." 287 Courts around the country
have had no difficulty in recognizing these markets.288 If a sale has
occurred on New York-based securities exchanges, courts have
rejected debtors' assertions that courts must inquire whether the
market for a particular stock is "thin"; courts have noted that if the
sale takes place in a recognized market, one need not look at
whether trading for a particular stock is robust, for it is the national
market itself, "not the popularity of the security," that "assures a
fair price through neutral market forces." 289
B. Other Aspects of a Commercially Reasonable Sale
When a sale occurs outside of a nationally recognized market
(such as the New York Stock Exchange), commentators have
287. See also Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp. v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir.
1991) ("Courts treat the term 'recognized market' restrictively, but universally
agree that securities markets properly fall within the exception.").
288. See Layne v. Bank One, 395 F.3d 271, 279-80 (6th Cir. 2005):
The U.C.C. comments define a "recognized market" as "one in which
the items sold are fungible and prices are not subject to individual
negotiation. For example, the New York Stock Exchange is a
recognized market." U.C.C. § 9-610 cmt. 9. Sales on a recognized
market are commercially reasonable "because the price on the
recognized market represents the fair market value [of the collateral]
from day to day." Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan of Henderson, Inc., 452
S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky.1970); see also FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524,
527-28 (5th Cir. 1990) ("A recognized market assures a fair price
through neutral market forces, and thus obviates the debtor's need for
protection through redemption, appraisal, or monitoring the sale.").
Therefore, where the collateral is sold in a recognized market,
Kentucky courts have found the transaction to be commercially
reasonable as a matter of law. Bailey v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 709
S.W.2d 841, 842 (Ky.Ct.App.1986). Courts in other states have held
similarly that a sale on a recognized market is per se commercially
reasonable. See Blanton, 918 F.2d at 529 (noting that under Texas law,
sale of collateral on a recognized market is commercially reasonable);
Suffield Bank v. LaRoche, 752 F.Supp. 54, 59 (D.R.I.1990) (holding
that the sale of pledged stock on the American Stock Exchange
"ensured that its sale was commercially reasonable and beyond the
scrutiny of this Court"). Moreover, the law provides that "[t]he fact that
a greater amount could have been obtained by ... disposition ... at a
different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured
party is not of itself sufficient to preclude the secured party from
establishing that the ... disposition ... was made in a commercially
reasonable manner." KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 355.9-627(1).
289. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 918 F.2d at 528. The court here was discussing the




observed that it is not any particular "aspect of the disposition"290
that drives the battle over whether the sale was commercially
reasonable; rather, the issue centers upon the price received.2
Courts generally look to certain "aspects" or facets of the actual
disposition of the collateral as a surrogate for finding a fair price.
These criteria include: the manner of selling (timing of the sale,
advertisement, location); the condition of the item (whether the
creditor maintained the collateral); and the price itself.
A full explication of the jurisprudence outlining what is
considered commercially reasonable is beyond the scope of this
paper. Suffice it to observe that most courts appear to focus on: the
manner that the creditor conducted the sale in relation to the
market available for the collateral; notice and advertising of the
sale; and the condition of the property.
C. Are Online Internet-Based Sales Commercially Reasonable?
Whether the disposition of collateral through online Internet
sales is commercially reasonable is a developing area.
At least two courts have found the use of online auction sites to
be a commercially reasonable manner of selling collateral2 92 and
two other courts have found that online advertising of a proposed
293sale is commercially reasonable. A law review article contends
that online auction sites, such as eBay, should be recognized as
commercially reasonable national markets and laments the failure
of courts to recognize them as such.294 Another law review article
contends that eBay sales of repossessed automobiles should be
290. JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-10, at 903 (5th ed. 2000).
291. Id. § 25-10, at 904.
292. CNH Capital Am., LLC v. Wilmot Farming Ventures, LLC, No. 07-
0611, 2008 WL 2386166 (W.D. La. June 11, 2008). The court notes briefly that
a sale is commercially reasonable if it is sold pursuant to the usual manner of a
"recognized market" but does not further elaborate whether their analysis was
conducted under safe-harbor (a), (b), or (c) of section 9-627. See also Union
Nat'l Bank of Wichita v. Schmitz, 853 P.2d 1180 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that a sale of a used automobile via an auto dealer-only, private auction netting
only $920 was commercially reasonable in spite of the fact that this procedure
essentially barred the debtor from participating and increased the likelihood that
the maximum amount that could be achieved from the sale was the wholesale
price of the used car).
293. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Stelmach Const. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-2026-
CM, 2001 WL 969052 (D. Kan. 8/15/01) (applying Kansas law); Fin. Fed.
Credit, Inc. v. Boss Transp., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
294. See Michael Korybut, Article 9"s Incorporation Strategy and Novel, New
Markets For Collateral: A Theory Of Non-Adoption, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 137 (2007).
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held to meet the test of commercial reasonableness.29 5An on-line
monograph on government sales notes that online auctioning is
proving to be one of the most effective methods for state and
federal agencies to dispose of surplus, seized, used, and lost
items. 296 Factors in favor of finding that broad-based national
online auction sites can be considered as appropriate national
markets under the U.C.C. include (1) the wide audience for such
markets, far broader than could be found in any single town or
state where a public or private sale might be held; (2) the increased
bidding activity through a wider group of interested parties; 297 (3)
the efficiency of such online auctions in lower direct and indirect
costs for sellers; and (4) and the speed by which such auctions can
be conducted, reducing the time that the creditor must store the
collateral and reducing the chance of deterioration in the
collateral's value.
298
295. Richard H. Nowka, eBay Auctions Of Repossessed Motor Vehicles-A
Template for Commercial Reasonableness Under Revised Article 9, 31 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 281 (2007).
296. Korybut, supra note 294, at 152-53 (citing DAViD C. WYLD, IBM CTR.
FOR THE Bus. OF Gov'T, GOVERNMENT GARAGE SALES: ONLINE AUCTIONS AS
TOOLS FOR ASSET MANAGEMENT (Nov. 2004), http://www.businessofgovemment.
org/pdfs/WyldReport3.pdf).
297. There are obvious differences between a national online auction on a
well-recognized Internet site with a private auction conducted locally, and these
differences seem to favor online auctions. For example, in Walker v. McTague,
the sale of a business was held in sealed-bid auction, advertised only in the local
newspaper. The court found this a commercially unreasonable sale, including
but not limited to the fact that the creditor was the winning, and only, bidder.
Walker v. Mctague, 737 N.E.2d 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
298. See City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith v. Unique Structures, Inc., 49 F.3d
1330 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the sale of twenty-seven mobile homes via a
private, cash-only repossession sale was not commercially reasonable). The
Court held that while a private cash sale with notice could be legitimate and
reasonable, the bank did not sell the collateral in a timely fashion after it
received possession. The collateral stood unprotected on a lot owned by the
bank, and the mobile homes fell into disrepair, with fixtures missing, windows
broken, and freeze damage incurred. The court attributed the disrepair to the
bank, finding that they breached a duty to preserve the property once it gained
possession, thus resulting in the depressed price brought by the collateral
making the sale commercially unreasonable. Id.
See also Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Miller Mining Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1424
(9th Cir. 1987) (creditor's failure to inspect heavy machinery upon voluntary
surrender, leaving it exposed to elements for twenty months, failing to make
repairs and prepare for sale, and eventually selling the collateral for scrap was
held to be not commercially reasonable).
Might a different result have occurred in both of these cases if the creditor
had quickly advertised and conducted an online Internet auction on a web site
appropriate for this type of collateral?
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EBay is not the only national online auction site.299
Bid4Assets.com specializes in tax-defaulted property, including
sales by the U.S. Marshall Service and by counties. BKassets.com
bills itself as "the only full service internet auctioneer dedicated to
the sale of bankruptcy related assets" and asserts that bankruptcy
trustees appoint it "through the United States Bankruptcy Court" to
conduct authorized sales.
It is clear that courts are only beginning to grapple with the
intersection between the Internet and U.C.C.'s requirement of a
commercially reasonable sale. While no bright line test has yet
emerged, it is possible that borrowers might prefer that lenders use
online dispositions rather than local sales. Given the fact that the
U.C.C. allows parties to contract about aspects of disposition of
collateral, it can be anticipated that creditors may start to build into
their security agreements clauses authorizing Internet disposition
of collateral on defined web sites.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Whether creditors should be entitled to pursue deficiency
judgments and how those creditors preserve their deficiency rights
are not unique Louisiana problems but rather have been dealt with
nationally in a variety of contexts.
Creditors attempting to preserve a deficiency judgment in
Louisiana under the Deficiency Judgment Act will want to
carefully comply with the procedural niceties required. Creditors
attempting to preserve a deficiency judgment under Louisiana's
version of U.C.C. Article 9 may want to consider how other states
have addressed this issue and may want to consider amending their
security agreements to take advantage of advertising and selling
collateral through Internet auction sites.
Debtors and sureties attempting to avoid a deficiency judgment
may want to consider how to leverage the public policy that forms
the backbone of the Deficiency Judgment Act and how to avoid the
exceptions to the Act.
What is certain is that courts will continue to face deficiency
judgment issues in a broad array of circumstances and that the
legislature may consider additional statutory amendments or
additions as the jurisprudence develops.
299. For statistics on eBay usage, see supra note 201.
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